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PROLOGUE: LAWYERS AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF AUTHORSHIP 
 If one of our students were to pass off someone else’s work as his 
or her own and we were to discover that misrepresentation, the pen-
alties would be harsh. But as lawyers, we hold ourselves to less rig-
orous standards for plagiarism than those to which we hold our stu-
dents. Where research assistants make significant contributions to 
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might track and measure style differentials in judicial opinions as opposed to fiction or po-
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their professors’ papers and sometimes even draft large sections of 
those papers, they are rarely given anything more than an acknowl-
edgement in a footnote.1 Law firm partners, we suspect, think noth-
ing of asking junior associates to draft entire articles or book chap-
ters and then send them out under their name (again, often without 
acknowledgement of the flunky’s authorship). And then there is the 
matter of judges. Law clerks are said to draft the vast majority of 
opinions for judges. Yet, if one were to ask most lawyers and judges 
whether authorship credit should be given to the individual clerks, 
they would in all likelihood think the question ridiculous. Why do we, 
as lawyers, consider proper attribution of authorship so important 
for our students and so unimportant for ourselves?2 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Federal judges enjoy a large amount of discretion in how they go 
about writing opinions. Once a judge is assigned an opinion, the 
judge may choose to write the opinion alone, doing both the research 
and writing without any assistance. Judges may also turn to their 
clerks to help research relevant law or to draft parts of the opinion. 
Some judges may allow clerks to draft entire opinions, while they 
themselves contribute only a light editorial overview. Commentators 
have discussed the practice of delegating significant portions of the 
opinion-writing task to clerks, and more than a few have criticized 
it.3 But no one seems to know exactly how much delegation goes on; 
                                                                                                                     
 1.  Law professors, their misuse of sources, and failures to properly attribute credit have been 
in the news lately.  See Daniel J. Hemel & Lauren A.E. Schuker, Prof Admits to Misusing Source, 
HARV. CRIMSON ONLINE, Sept. 27, 2004, at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=503493 (quot-
ing Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz as making the justificatory point that although the 
rules governing plagiarism by undergraduates are clear (and harsh), the norms of attribution 
and citation in the legal profession—where judges frequently rely on lawyers’ briefs and clerks’ 
memoranda in drafting opinions—are less clear); Sara Rimer, When Plagiarism’s Shadow Falls 
on Admired Scholars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at B9 (discussing criticisms of Harvard Law 
Professors Laurence Tribe and Charles Ogletree Jr.).  
 2. See Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: Mixed Messages for Law Stu-
dents, 100 DICK. L. REV. 677 (1996) (discussing the mixed messages about plagiarism that 
law professors and legal professionals send to law students).   
 3. For examples of works discussing the practice of delegating to law clerks, see 
FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING (1994); JONATHAN 
MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS 9-11 (2002); WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE 
OPINION OF THE COURT 42-45 (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 139-59 (1996); David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Rela-
tionships with Their Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 236, 238 (1986); Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers 
or Agents? What Lazarus’s Closed Chambers Adds to Our Understanding of Law Clerks at 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 200-06 (2000); J. Daniel Mahoney, 
Law Clerks: For Better or for Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 332-34, 338-44 (1988); David 
McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
509, 555-67 (2001); Nadine J. Wichern, Comment, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving 
Justice in the Media Age, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 621 (1999); Marvin E. Frankel, A Matter of 
Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1994, at E15; Alain L. Sanders, Putting a Thumbprint on 
History, TIME, Aug. 6, 1990, at 75. Going back further in time, see THE FORGOTTEN 
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commentators rely on anecdotes, rumors, and, at best, informal sur-
veys.4 
 In prior work, we asked why, in selecting Supreme Court Justices, 
there was little attempt to use the available data on the relative per-
formances of federal circuit court judges (the primary pool from 
which Supreme Court Justices are chosen).5 In this Essay, we ask 
why few have attempted to provide a systematic analysis of author-
ship patterns among federal circuit court judges. We use generic 
techniques from computational linguistics, as well as several meth-
ods tailored for the judicial setting, to explore both the desirability 
and feasibility of determining the authorship of judicial opinions. 
 Information about the production process (as opposed to informa-
tion about the end product alone) can be useful in decisions regarding 
judicial promotion. Whether a particular judge expends effort in au-
thoring her own opinions may have bearing on how suited the judge 
is for elevation to a higher court, including the Supreme Court. 
Knowing whether individual judges use their scarce time to manage 
their clerks’ writing or to engage in the writing task themselves may 
help determine whether there is a need for more judges and re-
sources for the judiciary. If we observe that a spike in the volume of 
cases coincides with judges suddenly placing greater reliance on their 
clerks to write opinions, we might want to support an expansion of 
the federal judiciary. Authorship information may also help identify 
judges who are no longer able or willing to perform their tasks ade-
quately. Once identified, peer pressure and other forms of public op-
probrium may lead the judges to either increase their activity level or 
                                                                                                                     
MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR’S 
WASHINGTON (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds., 2002); Chester A. Newland, 
Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299, 312-16 
(1961); see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 238 (3d ed. 1975) (quoting 
Dean Acheson on his clerkship experience with Justice Brandeis); DREW PEARSON & 
ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 109 (1936) (discussing Justice Harlan Stone’s use of 
his secretary during his drafting process). The most recent and most serious attempt to 
systematically survey former Supreme Court law clerks about their involvement in the 
opinion-writing process is contained in the forthcoming book, ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. 
WEIDEN, SORCERER’S APPRENTICE: LAW CLERKS AT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (forthcoming 
2005) (manuscript at ch. 5, at 36, on file with authors) (“Nineteen percent of the clerks said 
that their justice made revisions in most cases. Seven percent said that their justice only 
changed clerk-written drafts in some cases and four percent said that revisions were made 
in few or no cases. What is striking from these results is that thirty percent of clerks had 
their drafts issued without modification, as opinions by their justice at least some of the 
time.”). 
 4. As the reader will later see, the criticism about the reliance on anecdote, rumor, 
and informal surveys is something that our project is also subject to since we needed some 
baseline piece of information about “true” authorship levels to test out various authorship 
testing methods. The goal, however, is to develop a set of methods of testing authorship 
such that reliance on these often nonverifiable methods can be reduced.    
 5. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: 
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004). 
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retire. Law students applying for judicial clerkships will find it use-
ful to know whether their potential employer does her own writing or 
delegates it all to her clerks. And—highly relevant from our perspec-
tive as researchers—authorship information has the potential to im-
prove academic research on judicial behavior. 
 Part II of this Essay sets out a framework to explore whether it is 
worthwhile to investigate which judges write their opinions. We ex-
plore whether there is societal value in knowing information about 
the input levels that society’s agents (in this case, the judges) put 
into the production process (the product being judicial opinions). 
 A variety of techniques may be employed to determine the author-
ship of opinions. Part III sets out tests to determine the viability of 
these techniques. We use the limited existing information on author-
ship—a handful of judges such as Richard Posner, Frank Easter-
brook, and Michael Boudin participate more actively in the writing of 
their opinions than do most other judges6—to test how well the dif-
ferent authorship tests perform in distinguishing such judges.  
 Our sample pool consists of all circuit court judges who were both 
active and under the age of sixty-five as of May 2003 and had been 
on the bench for the period from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 
2000.7 For each judge in the sample, we selected opinions for analysis 
at random from those generated during the three-year sample period.  
 Based on this sample, we report that the generic tests drawn from 
computational linguistics fail to distinguish Posner, Easterbrook, and 
Boudin as judges most likely to author their opinions. The generic 
tests, however, do not control for the subject matter of specific opin-
ions. The common phrases used in opinions of a specific genre (for 
example, administrative law opinions) will cause the generic meth-
odologies to treat all such opinions as more likely to be by the same 
author, even if different authors actually wrote the opinions. If the 
randomly selected opinions for one judge are all of the same subject 
matter but those for another judge are not, this factor alone may lead 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Several commentators have remarked on the writing practices of Judges Posner 
and Easterbrook. See Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Pos-
ner’s First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991—Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial 
Dissenting Style, 69 MO. L. REV. 73, 74 n.12 (2004); Martha Middleton, Shaping a Circuit 
in the Chicago School Image, NAT’L L.J., July 20, 1987, at 1 (discussing Easterbrook and 
Posner). Informal conversations with a number of other judges and former law clerks con-
firmed that Judges Posner and Easterbrook author all of their own opinions. Many also 
mentioned Judge Boudin as someone who authored most of his own opinions. Other judges 
were also mentioned, albeit less frequently, as authoring substantial portions of their opin-
ions. We use Posner, Easterbrook, and Boudin—those judges with the highest a priori like-
lihood of self-authorship—to calibrate the effectiveness of our authorship methodologies. 
 7. We generated much of this dataset in our earlier article ranking judges based on 
judicial performance. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5. To take advantage of some of the 
data collected for that project, we restrict our analysis to the same pool of judges here. 
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the generic authorship tests to give the first judge a higher self-
authorship score. 
 We also provide more customized tests designed to control, at 
least in part, for the subject matter of judicial opinions. Using these 
tests, we are able to distinguish our test judges—Posner, Easter-
brook, and Boudin—as ranking consistently high in terms of self-
authorship of judicial opinions. Part IV concludes and provides pos-
sible extensions of the authorship methodology. 
II.   THE UPSIDES AND DOWNSIDES TO DETERMINING JUDICIAL 
AUTHORSHIP 
 The production of judicial opinions is a joint venture between the 
judges and their staffs—for purposes of opinion writing, the law 
clerks. The outside world sees the end product in the final opinion 
that appears in West’s case reporters. Outsiders cannot distinguish 
the contributions of the various participants. For each opinion, only 
the primary writing judge is identified (for an appellate opinion, the 
other judges on the panel are also identified as secondary partici-
pants, but their relative involvement is not specified).  
 Lore has it that many opinions are drafted primarily by the 
judge’s law clerks and sometimes even by staff attorneys. Such dele-
gation may help judges handle their ever-increasing caseloads.8 At 
the other extreme, there are some judges who, despite the caseloads, 
are reputed to take complete responsibility for opinion writing (for 
example, Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, who seem to be 
able to do this and more9). Further, occasions may arise when the 
other judges on the panel draft significant portions of the opinion. 
But the involvement of these subsidiary coauthors is never identified. 
In addition, norms of appropriate behavior mean that the clerks 
rarely reveal what occurred in their judges’ chambers; the informa-
tion the clerks possess about relative responsibility for the various 
opinions is seldom reported in any public and verifiable manner.10  
                                                                                                                     
 8. See Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have 
Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 944-45 (1995) (noting that growth in 
caseload has led to an increase in the number of law clerks and in the amount of work 
delegated to them); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and 
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274 
n.3 (1996) (citing materials that document the increase in judicial caseload).  
 9. See supra note 6.  
 10. When clerks do reveal the goings-on in their judges’ chambers, they can some-
times receive considerable criticism. A recent example is the criticism that was leveled at 
Edward Lazarus’ Closed Chambers, a memoir of his year on the Supreme Court clerking 
for Justice Blackmun. See Kenney, supra note 3 (discussing some of the criticism). Prior to 
that, there was criticism of the many law clerks who spoke to Bob Woodward and Scott 
Armstrong when they were researching their book on the workings of the Court, The 
Brethren. See George Gold, Loose Tongues: How Stone Cautioned Clerks, A.B.A. J., Oct. 
1985, at 28; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 336.  
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 The agency concept provides a useful framework for thinking 
about the judicial production problem. Judges are agents who per-
form a set of tasks, which include producing judicial opinions, for the 
public (the principal in the relationship). A variety of consumers—
lawyers, law students, litigants, researchers, and other judges, 
among others—use these judicial opinions to understand the law. In 
order to perform their tasks, judges are authorized to employ a set of 
subsidiary agents (law clerks and staff attorneys), who are hired, su-
pervised, and evaluated by the judges themselves. Society’s goal as 
the principal is arguably to ensure that the judges produce at maxi-
mal potential, while at the same time providing for the judges’ inde-
pendence.  
 Ordinarily, principals attempt to monitor the conduct of their 
agents. If the agents do not work hard enough or produce high-
quality products, they get fired (or, in the case of politicians, they get 
voted out of office). Since society wishes to ensure the independence 
of federal judges, however, they are provided with virtually ironclad 
job security and fixed salaries. These elements of job security and 
fixed incomes mean that the public has relatively few levers with 
which to incentivize the judges; for the most part, judges do their 
work because they want to. It may appear pointless to inquire into 
judges’ relative levels of involvement in the production of opinions. 
Indeed, that view may be one reason why such information thus far 
has not been collected.  
                                                                                                                     
 As illustrated by the materials mentioned above, the one context where there has been 
some minimal revelation of the levels of delegation to law clerks is the Supreme Court. 
Even here the information is highly imperfect, often a function of clerk reconstructions 
in contexts where the explicit goal is to praise the Justice or journalistic reports about 
high profile cases resting on undisclosed sources. But at least there is some information. 
Plus, to the extent that some former Justices have (a) opened their papers to the public 
and (b) kept accurate records on clerk-judge communication, researchers have a starting 
point to try and determine the level of clerk delegation. Among the prominent recent ex-
amples along these lines are the Legal Affairs article by David Garrow criticizing the 
amount of delegation of power by Justice Blackmun to his clerks (especially later in his 
career) and the Vanity Fair exposé, following the 2000 election, that used information 
from law clerks to construct a story about how the decision was made. See David Gar-
row, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2005, available at 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2005/feature_garrow_mayjun05.msp; David 
Margolick et al., The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310. For examples of for-
mer law clerks writing about their Justices, see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. 
POWELL, JR. (1994); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT 
CLERK’S VIEW (1974); Bruce A. Ackerman, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1709 (1986); Anne M. Coughlin, Writing for Justice Powell, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 541 
(1999); James L. Volling, Warren E. Burger: An Independent Pragmatist Remembered, 22 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 39 (1996); and Kevin J. Worthen, Shirt-Tales: Clerking for Byron 
White, 1994 BYU L. REV. 349. The precise contours of what can and cannot be revealed by 
former clerks, however, seems to be unclear. That lack of clarity of the disclosure rules, 
when combined with the fondness (or fear) that most clerks have for their judges, we sus-
pect, keeps most clerks from going on the record with information about the authorship 
practices in their judges’ chambers.   
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 In Part II.A, we put forward the claim that a better understand-
ing of the level of judicial input into the opinion-writing process can 
potentially help the management of judicial agents in at least three 
circumstances: deciding on promotion when the quality of the final 
output is hard to evaluate, determining incentives for the judges as 
part of a judicial opinion production team, and assessing how best to 
allocate resources to the judiciary. We also identify others who may 
find knowledge on authorship useful: researchers studying judicial 
behavior, law students entering the judicial clerkship market, and 
those considering how much to rely on the opinions of specific judges. 
 Having considered the upsides, in Part II.B we note possible 
downsides to the project that colleagues have mentioned to us. These 
are the danger of improper negative inferences and the problem of 
imperfect measurement. 
A.   Upsides 
1.   Promotions and the Quality of Judicial Output 
 Information on input into the production process can assist in the 
evaluation of the quality of a final product where such quality is dif-
ficult to observe directly. For many products, such as legal and medi-
cal services, product quality is hard to measure. When a lawyer loses 
a case or a transaction fails to be completed, it is difficult to know 
whether the result should be attributed to the lawyer or to other fac-
tors. If a patient’s health does not improve under a doctor’s care, does 
this reflect the doctor’s failure to deliver competent medical care or 
the patient’s own initial health condition? 
 Where the final output is difficult to evaluate, another solution is 
to look to inputs.11 For example, the difficulty in evaluating lawyers’ 
product is often given as a reason for why lawyers bill by the hour.12 
If one can know the levels of effort and skill a lawyer brings to the 
production process, one can determine whether the bad outcome was 
the product of inadequate effort and skill, some other factor, or ran-
dom chance. While doctors are typically not paid on an hourly basis, 
information on how much attention and effort a doctor vests in a par-
ticular patient is likely to be relevant to any potential medical mal-
practice claim against that doctor. 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS 20 (1995).  
 12. There has been considerable debate over whether hours billed serves as a good 
measure of lawyer performance (or, put differently, an effective means of monitoring). See 
Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical 
Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing the monitor-
ing literature in the law firm context). 
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 In earlier work, we suggested that one way to evaluate the quality 
of a judicial opinion was to look at citation rates.13 Citation rates, 
however, are an imperfect measure because they are affected by a 
number of factors other than quality: the subject matter of the case, 
the reputation of the circuit, and the reputation of the judge.14 There-
fore, knowing the level of the judge’s participation in the production 
process supplements information about citation rates. A judge who 
rates a low self-authorship score coupled with a low citation rate may 
signal her relatively low level of engagement in the judicial process. 
 Information as to individual inputs into the production process 
can also be useful in instances where the employer cares about more 
than product quality. An employer might want to know, for example, 
whether a particular employee is exerting herself fully or only par-
tially. This is information from which the employer can potentially 
infer a number of things, such as the employee’s commitment to the 
job, her interest in the project, and her likely effect on her coworkers 
(to the extent they take their cues from her).  
 For some jobs, process—which might be seen to include the 
agent’s commitment and dedication to the process—might have an 
importance of its own. In the judicial context, commitment and dedi-
cation to the task may suggest a concern for justice. Someone who 
will work day and night on her task, even if she is not the quickest at 
it, may be more likely to produce a just decision than someone who is 
highly intelligent and writes quickly but is not willing to spend more 
than a few hours a day on a case. The willingness to work hard, we 
suggest, may correlate with a judge’s concern that a case be deter-
mined in a fair manner (as opposed to a slovenly willingness to de-
cide the case more randomly). Achieving justice, vague and amor-
phous a concept as it may be, may be more important to society than 
ensuring that judges write high-quality opinions.15 The same kind of 
argument can be made with respect to other abstract concepts such 
as honesty and integrity.16  
                                                                                                                     
 13. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 34, 48-61. 
 14. There is an extensive literature on the pitfalls and benefits of using citation rates 
as a measure of quality. For discussions, see Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation 
Counts in Judgments on Promotion, Tenure, and Status, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (1993); Choi 
& Gulati, supra note 5, at 48 n.38, 54-55; William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A 
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998); and 
Russell Smyth, Do Judges Behave as Homo Economicus, and if So, Can We Measure Their 
Performance? An Antipodean Perspective on a Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1299 (2005).  
 15. See John V. Orth, Judging the Tournament, Jurist (Apr. 15, 2004), at 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-jc/choi-gulati-orth-taha.php.   
 16. For example, one could question the honesty and integrity of someone who chose 
to exert little effort in making a decision even though the lack of effort made it more likely 
that the outcome was more random and only loosely related to the facts of the specific case. 
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 Consider the problem of deciding judicial promotions. If the job at 
the lower level is substantially different from that at the promoted 
level, high-quality production at the lower-level job may not predict 
high-quality production after promotion. The work of trial judges, for 
example, is primarily in the area of trial management, with the occa-
sional authorship of an opinion. Circuit court judges, on the other 
hand, focus to a greater extent on the production of judicial opinions. 
Where a trial judge is being considered for promotion to a circuit 
court position, information about dedication to the job (the inputs) 
might be more important than which employee produced higher-
quality opinions at the lower level (the outputs).  
 Almost all the candidates given serious consideration for ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court tend to have prior judicial experi-
ence, most of them on the federal circuit courts of appeals.17 What, 
then, if we were to find out that a judge who was a candidate for 
promotion to the Supreme Court wrote none of her own lower court 
opinions, but instead delegated them all to her law clerks? And what 
if there was another candidate who wrote all of her own opinions? 
This information may not be dispositive in terms of eliminating the 
first candidate, but questions would be raised and inquiries would be 
made. If it turned out that the first judge spent a significant portion 
of the year skiing, sailing, or rock climbing, the public would proba-
bly conclude that this judge was not committed to the job.  
 On the other hand, it might turn out that this judge, instead of ac-
tually writing her own opinions, was spending her time managing 
her clerks and training them to write and analyze. If it also turned 
out that these clerk-written opinions were considered to be of high 
quality by experts, the final evaluation of this candidate might be 
positive. This would be especially so if the job at the higher level re-
quired even more management and training skills than the lower-
level job. Indeed, the inability of the other judge to effectively utilize 
her clerks in the writing process might be seen by some as a negative 
factor in the promotion decision. 
 The information about the judge’s involvement in the writing pro-
cess alone is therefore unlikely to be dispositive. It may, however, 
lead people to look for other pieces of information so as to be able to 
make inferences. Judges themselves may voluntarily reveal more in-
formation about their style of decisionmaking in response to objective 
information on their involvement in writing opinions. Some evalua-
tors may see direct judicial involvement in the writing of drafts as of 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND 
THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 170 (1999); Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of 
Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003). 
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paramount importance. Others may regard judges as also having a 
responsibility to train law clerks. The information that may emerge 
on judicial input into the writing may be important to both sets of 
evaluators, although it may lead them to different conclusions about 
who should be promoted. 
2.   Fine-Tuning Incentives 
 A much-discussed question in economics is how to devise solutions 
to the “team production” problem.18 The team production problem oc-
curs when production occurs in teams and the relative levels of credit 
for the final product are hard to allocate.19 Where individual respon-
sibility cannot be allocated, a free-rider problem may arise whereby 
team members have an incentive to shirk.20 There are methods em-
ployers use to solve the team production problem, which include in-
ternal peer pressure within the team and incentives to members to 
monitor and manage the other team members.21 
 In the case of judicial opinion writing, the judge is the manager. 
The judge, who is allocated full credit for the output of her chambers, 
has both the ability to monitor subordinates and an incentive to en-
sure that they work hard. The potential problem, however, is with 
the judge. If a judge wishes to shirk, there is no formal mechanism to 
penalize her. A judge can monitor clerks and fire them or give them 
bad references. But there are few direct mechanisms that enable the 
public to monitor and penalize a federal judge.  
 Informal mechanisms, however, do exist. Judges care about status 
and prestige.22 They will care if information is released showing that 
some of them demonstrate no involvement in the opinion-writing 
process (especially if the data also shows that their colleagues are 
highly involved in that process). Information concerning a lack of au-
thorship, when coupled with a low citation rate, may indicate that a 
judge is simply not doing a good job, thereby reducing that judge’s 
reputation among her peers and the general public. Judges may 
demonstrate greater participation in the authorship process to pre-
vent or remedy this situation.  
 But what if these judges are not good writers? Might not it be bet-
ter that they remove themselves from the writing portion of the pro-
                                                                                                                     
 18. The classic papers on the team production problem are Armen A. Alchian & Har-
old Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 777 (1972), and Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 
(1982). 
 19. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 18, at 779.    
 20. Id. at 780.  
 21. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (describing the literature on the team production problem).  
 22. Smyth, supra note 14, at 1306-07 nn.39-42 (citing support on the point). 
2005]         WHICH JUDGES WRITE THEIR OWN OPINIONS 1087 
 
ject? The point is a fair one, but it leads to a more important point: 
the motivation of politicians. Once a judge who has no skill at writing 
is appointed, there may be a valid argument that the judge should 
not be compelled to participate in the writing process.23 But writing 
skills and the willingness to write opinions should be at least two of 
the criteria for appointing a federal judge. And if someone who lacks 
those basic characteristics is appointed, the blame should fall on the 
politicians who made the appointment. If politicians are penalized for 
bad appointments on basic matters such as writing skills, they may 
be discouraged from using judicial appointments as political favors or 
from allowing their choice to be determined on the basis of litmus 
tests; for example, a judge’s likely vote on issues such as abortion 
and the death penalty. Politicians may then in fact focus on more 
mundane, yet fundamental, matters such as writing skill. 
 Another indirect incentive exists. Like the rest of us, judges be-
come ill, old, and sometimes uninterested in their jobs. Being a judge, 
however, brings status, power, and guaranteed income. There is the 
danger that a judge who is beyond the point of being able or willing 
to perform the job will be tempted to eschew retirement.24 So long as 
the judge has able law clerks, casual observers on the outside will 
find it difficult to detect the drop in performance.25 It is likely that 
the law clerks and the other judges will be able to observe when the 
judge is not able to perform adequately, but while there may be in-
ternal grumblings in the courthouse, this information will rarely find 
its way to the general public.26 We assume that there is a strong so-
cial norm against the disclosure of such information.  
 If, however, information is available as to judicial input into the 
writing process, any significant drop in interest or capability will re-
sult in public pressure for the judge to retire. For example, it is likely 
that no litigant wants a case to be decided by a senile or otherwise 
absent judge. And while the law clerks making decisions for these 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Alternatively, some might argue that judges who are not good writers are pre-
cisely the ones who should be incentivized to write more so that they learn to become bet-
ter writers. In his diary for the online magazine, Slate, Judge Posner writes: 
Most judges nowadays, because of heavy caseloads, delegate the writing of their 
judicial opinions to their clerks. It’s a mistake on a number of grounds: The 
more you write, the faster you write; only the effort to articulate a decision ex-
poses the weak joints in the analysis; and the judge-written opinion provides 
greater insight into the judge’s values and reasoning process and so provides 
greater information—not least to the judge. 
Richard Posner, Diary: A Weeklong Electronic Journal, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2002), at 
http://slate.msn.com/?id=2060621&entry=2060676. 
 24. Cf. Smyth, supra note 14, at 1301-03 (pointing to evidence suggesting that judicial 
retirement rates respond to changes in incentives, such as pension levels).  
 25. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 112 (1995).  
 26. Supreme Court Justices are perhaps an exception to the rule, as we see from the 
rumors about Justice Thurgood Marshall. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. Our 
primary interest in this Essay, however, is in the less visible lower court judges.  
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absent judges may have done well on their law school exams, the liti-
gants might prefer to have their cases decided by judges who have at 
least some meaningful experience in the world rather than by stu-
dents fresh out of law school. 
 The question that remains is as follows: Would disclosure of this 
information have any effect on a particular judge, a superannuated 
one for example? We suspect it would. While there are few external 
sources of pressure that can be brought to bear on a judge, status, 
power, and prestige are all a function of the public’s perception of 
that person. If the public begins to lose confidence in the judge be-
cause of evidence that her ability to write has declined, the judge 
may consider either increasing her effort or retiring. 
3.   Allocation of Resources 
 The determination of resource allocation for the federal judiciary 
is made by the legislature. Given that there are no meaningful com-
petitive forces to tell the legislature when the production process is 
faulty, the legislature itself has to collect the necessary information 
to make such evaluations. For example, it is well documented that 
there has been a dramatic explosion in the caseloads carried by fed-
eral judges over the past few decades.27 The number of judges, how-
ever, has not kept pace with the increased workload.28 This disparity 
has led some to call for more judgeships;29 these calls have, in turn, 
been countered by others.30  
 One element in the argument that more judges are needed has 
been that judges today, unlike judges decades ago, are forced to turn 
to law clerks, staff attorneys, and other shortcuts to enable them to 
tackle their expanded caseloads.31 Skeptics, however, say that the 
caseloads are not so large as to prevent existing judges from tackling 
them. Some of the questions in the debate might be answered by data 
                                                                                                                     
 27. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, 
FINAL REPORT 13-17 (1998); see also Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Vir-
tues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685 (2000) (dis-
cussing the caseload explosion and the responses of the courts of appeals); Lauren K. 
Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3 (de-
scribing and critiquing the methods judges have used to deal with increased caseloads). 
 28. COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra 
note 27, at 14. 
 29. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, 
Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52; Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial 
Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185 (1993).   
 30. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Federal Judi-
ciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the 
Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1173-74 (1994) (expressing the concern that a sig-
nificant increase in the size of the federal judiciary will hurt collegiality); Harry T. Ed-
wards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 
1675 (2003) (agreeing with Judge Wilkinson on the collegiality point). 
 31. See sources cited supra note 8. 
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that would indicate whether judicial involvement in the writing pro-
cess has decreased in direct correlation with the increase in 
caseloads over the past several decades. 
 Court administration can also be helped in other ways. Along with 
the explosion in caseload, there has been an increase in the complex-
ity and volume of many areas of federal regulation.32 In order to 
tackle this increased complexity and volume, judges may be focusing 
more attention on certain types of cases while delegating others. If 
certain types of cases—for example, immigration, social security, se-
curities regulation, or habeas cases—are consistently delegated to 
the clerks or the staff attorneys (as measured through a low judge 
self-authorship score), such evidence supports the argument that 
these specific types of cases deserve a separate set of specialized 
courts with expert judges, much like the U.S. Tax Court.33 
4.   Research on Judicial Behavior 
 Perhaps the most immediate application of information on au-
thorship rates is improvement of the quality of research on judicial 
behavior. Authorship rates can be used as an explanatory variable in 
regressions that seek to explain a large number of outcome variables. 
                                                                                                                     
 32. On the emergence of the regulatory state and the accompanying enormous expan-
sion in federal regulation (and judicial interpretations of those regulations), see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).  
 33. We are not aware of any systematic research into the question of whether there is 
a greater use of clerks in some substantive areas of the law, although it strikes us that this 
is an important area of research. Cf. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3 (manuscript at ch. 5, 
at 38-39) (finding some evidence that Justices were more likely to make substantial revi-
sions to draft opinions when particular issues were involved). There are statements by 
commentators that suggest that the level of clerk and staff attorney usage is much higher 
in unpublished opinions. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of 
Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (1995) (noting that clerks—not 
judges—generally draft the opinions); Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion, LEGAL TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 2004, at 1, 10 (quoting Judge Kozinksi on the matter). If it turns out that certain 
categories of cases are more likely to be the subject of unpublished opinions, it should fol-
low that clerk and staff attorney usage will be higher in this category of cases. So, for ex-
ample, if ninety percent of prisoner or immigration appeals result in unpublished opinions, 
it may well be that the major portion of lawmaking in these areas is done by law clerks and 
not judges.  This is an outcome that strikes us as both unsatisfactory and calling out for re-
forms such as specialization. For a trenchant critique of the current practices of issuing 
unpublished opinions, see Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private 
Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004). On the matter of whether the 
federal courts should specialize more in terms of subject matter, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67 (1995). 
 Along the lines mentioned above, an empirical study by one of the Symposium par-
ticipants, James Brudney, finds, among other things, that Supreme Court Justices 
seem to apply statutory canons of construction very differently in cases that arise in 
the more complex and less high-profile areas of labor law than they do in what might 
be seen as the more sexy areas. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=534982. 
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Among these outcome variables that researchers might be interested 
in better explaining are voting patterns, citation rates and styles, in-
vocation rates,34 publication patterns, independence levels,35 and 
choices about styles of argument (for example, whether one prefers 
the use of multifactor balancing tests). It may be that whether a 
judge writes a significant portion of her opinions is a positive or 
negative explanatory factor for one or more of these outcome vari-
ables. And that information will advance our knowledge of judicial 
behavior. For example, it has been suggested that there are certain 
types of cases (perhaps those raising important constitutional ques-
tions) where judges are more likely to be actively involved in the 
writing and editing of an opinion than other types of cases such as 
tax, securities, and bankruptcy.36 If authorship rates for different 
opinions were known, this suggestion could be tested. And, as noted 
earlier, if it turned out that certain types of cases were consistently 
delegated to the clerks, this might be reason enough to think about 
specialized courts for those cases. More broadly, if higher levels of 
authorship predict higher citation rates (and if citation rates are con-
sidered a good proxy for opinion quality), that might suggest that 
judges should be given incentives to write more of their own opinions. 
If, instead, regressions reveal the reverse effect, judges might be en-
couraged to write fewer opinions. Alternatively, if citation rates were 
seen as an inadequate measure of judicial output quality, one could 
use whatever other measure (perhaps a survey of experts) and then 
observe whether higher-quality argumentation or explanation in ju-
dicial opinions is related to self-authorship rates.37 The point is that 
we will not really appreciate the value of knowing authorship rates 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Invocations involve situations where one judge invokes the name of another judge 
when discussing an opinion written by that other judge. Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 58. 
We consider invocations as a special sign of respect on the part of one judge for another. 
See id. at 58-59 (discussing the concept of invocations). 
 35. One way of measuring judicial independence is to examine whether a judge tends 
to side more systematically with judges nominated by a President of the same political 
party as the judge in question. See id. at 63. We analyze circuit court judges, active from 
1998 to 2000, based on this measure of independence in Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 61-
67. 
 36. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3 (manuscript at ch. 5, at 38) (finding that while 
most clerks reported that the Justices did not seem to have a particular pattern of deciding 
whether to make edits on their drafts, there is some evidence that Justices only substan-
tially revised their draft opinions when particular issues were involved or when the cases 
were landmark or important cases). 
 37. The claim is often made that the discipline of writing out an argument is what 
enables the reader to test the logic of the argument. See Posner, supra note 23. Law clerks, 
who have been delegated the task of writing an opinion based on an argument that the 
judge has suggested, are perhaps less likely to second-guess the argument than the judge 
herself. Alternatively, some might think that law clerks are more likely to second-guess 
the logic of the argument and point out flaws. Once again, we do not know the answer. 
Knowing the information as to which opinions were solely authored versus which ones 
were not, however, might help us investigate further. 
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until we collect the information and run empirical tests on that in-
formation. Finally, assuming the information turns out to be useful, 
the authorship data might also be used as an outcome variable itself, 
and models could be constructed and tested to determine what fac-
tors determine—or at least correlate with—authorship rates. 
5.   Information for Law Clerks 
 Information about judicial writing proclivities will undoubtedly 
prove useful to law students applying for clerkships. The nature of a 
clerkship experience is a direct function of what the judge does. If the 
judge researches and writes all of her own opinions, there is little left 
for the clerks to do. If the judge is off skiing or at the beach for most 
of the year, only calling in on occasion, there will be an immense 
amount for the clerks to do and correspondingly little guidance from 
the judge.  
 Clerkships provide value to potential clerks in at least two ways: 
training and status. Law clerks are likely to receive minimal training 
if their judges are at the beach and have minimal contact with them. 
Clerks’ training is also likely to be minimal if their judges are so ca-
pable that they do all of their own research and writing.38 What the 
clerk who is seeking training wants, then, is the judge whose ap-
proach lies between the two extremes. Other clerks, who are seeking 
status and the power to shape the law, might want to look for a judge 
who delegates the major portion of opinion-writing discretion to the 
clerks. Clerks who primarily value leisure might prefer judges who 
need no help. Effective information about judges and their proclivi-
ties will assist prospective clerks in choosing judges who best suit 
their abilities and desires.39  
                                                                                                                     
 38. For example, clerkships with Justice Douglas were reputed to be among the worst 
because, at least in part, he did all his own writing and generally kept his clerks at a dis-
tance. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3 (manuscript at ch. 5, at 8) (reporting on inter-
views with former clerks for Justice Douglas).  
 39. Internet discussion fora, such as the Greedy Clerks list serve, have at least begun to facili-
tate the sharing of such information among current and former clerks. See FINDLAW’S INFIRMATION, 
GREEDY CLERKS BOARD, at http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs.tcl?topic=Greedy%20Clerks 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2005). The question whether a particular judge writes her own opinions 
has been discussed in at least one thread, which reported that Judges Posner, Easterbrook, 
Garza, and Niemeyer are among those federal circuit judges most likely to author their own 
opinions. See Posting of Lurks on Sept. 20, 2004 (message no. 25762) (naming Garza), at 
http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetch-msg.tcl; Posting of Lurks on Sept. 20, 2004 (mes-
sage no. 25768) (naming Posner), at http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetch-msg.tcl; 
Posting of Publius Rex on Sept. 20, 2004 (message no. 25769) (naming Niemeyer), at 
http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetch-msg.tcl; Posting of CTA7alum on Sept. 20, 2004 
(message no. 25793) (naming Easterbrook), at http://www.infirmation.com/bboard/clubs-fetch-
msg.tcl. 
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 But will a more effective process for matching clerks to judges 
bring social benefits? In terms of efficiency, it should.40 Clerks who 
desire to have a greater input in the writing process will end up with 
judges willing to allow their clerks to do so. Likewise, clerks more in-
terested in learning from a judge who actively manages opinion writ-
ing will be better able to find such judges. Whether such efficiency 
gains are great in magnitude and result in better judicial opinions, 
however, is unclear. To the extent the best clerks always opt for 
judges with a reputation as “feeder judges” for Supreme Court clerk-
ships, information on authorship will not change the market much 
(unless it indirectly affects which judges are the feeder judges). 
 If clerks, in fact, prefer to work for judges who tend to author 
their own opinions or are otherwise more active in the judicial proc-
ess, an indirect incentive effect on judges is possible. Judges would be 
forced to get more involved or accept lower-quality clerks. Alterna-
tively, if judges’ reputations for providing inadequate training hurt 
their ability to get good law clerks, they might engage in more train-
ing activities for clerks. 
6.   Informational Benefits to Opinion Users 
 Knowing an author’s identity serves as a useful shortcut in a vari-
ety of settings. For example, in a bookstore, one might use authors’ 
names to decide which books to scrutinize and which ones to ignore. 
Similarly, when one conducts academic research, there are some au-
thors who can be depended on for high-quality work and are there-
fore likely to be read first. Shortcuts such as an author’s identity are 
especially useful when the reader does not have the time or ability to 
read all of the available material and evaluate it piece by piece.  
 Lawyers and judges are faced with this dilemma on a daily basis. 
In attempting to construct their arguments, they have to draw from a 
vast body of available precedent and decide which arguments to use 
and which ones to reject or ignore. If there are multiple opinions that 
relate to a particular issue and there is but a limited amount of time 
to allocate to the task of analysis, a choice has to be made about 
which of those opinions should receive more attention. One of the 
variables used to sort through opinions is likely to be author identity. 
The dictates of formal precedent aside, opinions by judicial super-
stars like Hand, Friendly, and Cardozo will probably receive close 
scrutiny. 
 But what if it were known that while Judge Friendly wrote all his 
securities law opinions, he delegated his social security opinions to 
                                                                                                                     
 40. For research into improving the judge-clerk matching process that focuses on as-
pects of the market other than the one that we mention, see Christopher Avery et al., The 
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793 (2001).  
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his law clerks? Or, what if Judge Easterbrook was known to write all 
his own opinions and Judge Posner was known to write none of his? 
Presumably, that would make a difference as well, with opinions au-
thored solely by the judge receiving greater attention and those that 
were not receiving less attention.41 To push the argument further, it 
would help outsiders decide which opinions to concentrate on if the 
opinions were sorted based also on the various coauthors. So, if there 
were an opinion on the Second Circuit for which Judge X was the 
primary author, but to which Judge Hand had made a sufficient con-
tribution to be named coauthor, the opinion might receive greater au-
thority than if it were to appear under Judge X’s name alone (assum-
ing, for purposes of this point, that Judge X did not have a high repu-
tation). Pushing even further, law clerks could be identified as coau-
thors or even primary authors when their contributions so war-
ranted. The assumption would still be that the primary decision was 
made by the judge. But it would help outsiders who were attempting 
to determine how much weight to give a particular opinion to know 
who actually wrote the opinion.  
 Greater information on authorship may also add more credibility 
to—or alternatively quash—rumors on the supposed influence of law 
clerks in the writing process. There are rumors that Justice Thur-
good Marshall wrote very few of his own opinions and that he wrote 
fewer and fewer as he advanced in age.42 There are rumors that Jus-
                                                                                                                     
 41. Justice Brandeis famously said that the reason why the Supreme Court’s reputa-
tion was so high was that everyone knew that the Justices did all of their own work (a fact 
that is undoubtedly not true any longer). See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 
1939-1975, at 172-73 (1980) (describing Justice Brandeis’ views on the need for judges to 
author their own opinions). Judge Posner, in turn, explains: 
The less that lawyers and especially other judges regard judicial opinions as 
authentic expressions of what the judges think, the less they will rely on judi-
cial opinions for guidance and authority. . . . The more the thinking embodied 
in opinions is done by law clerks rather than by judges, the less authority opin-
ions will have. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 110 (1985). 
 42. See Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Ghostwriters on the Court?: A Stylistic Analysis of 
U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RES. 166, 172 (2002) (describing the ru-
mors regarding Justice Marshall’s relative lack of involvement in the opinion-writing proc-
ess). The public articulations of these rumors are contained in BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT 
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 258 (1979), and Terry Eastland, 
While Justice Sleeps, NAT’L REV., Apr. 21, 1989, at 24. See also Peter Huber, Advice to Jus-
tice Thomas, FORBES, Nov. 25, 1991, at 202 (finding that Justice Marshall’s opinions dur-
ing the 1990 term demonstrated four distinctive styles, corresponding to his four different 
law clerks). On the other side, those familiar with the workings of the Court and, in par-
ticular, Marshall’s chambers, have disputed the view articulated above. See JUAN 
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 370 (1998) (quoting both a 
close friend and former law clerk of Marshall); Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the 
Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109, 2112 (1992) (stating that while Marshall may have relied 
“more heavily on his law clerks for opinion writing than did the other Justices during the 
early years of his tenure, . . . his practices were not wildly out of line with those of the oth-
ers on the Court”).  
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tice Kennedy’s opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey43 was the 
product of undue influence from one of his liberal clerks.44 And judges 
like William Douglas, Learned Hand, and Richard Posner are re-
puted to have written all their own opinions.45  
 These rumors may unfairly hurt or benefit a judge’s reputation, 
effects that are especially problematic when some of the rumors are 
driven by stereotypes based on race and gender. Law clerk denials 
and confirmations occur, but these lack credibility since the law 
clerks have an incentive to do everything to heighten the reputation 
of their judge, because their own status is tied to the status of their 
judge.46 If, however, authorship can be determined using credible and 
verifiable methods, these rumors can be quashed or confirmed.  
B.   Downsides 
 When we began this project, we saw few disadvantages to collect-
ing authorship information on judges. More information, we as-
sumed, was a good thing. But a number of our colleagues, seeing our 
inquiry as problematic, disagreed. Their prime objection was that the 
venture was a waste of our time and resources because information 
about judicial authorship, even if it could be obtained, was useless—
an objection that we hope Part II.A has answered. Below, we tackle 
two of the other objections we heard most often.  
1.   Danger of Unjustified Inferences 
 One could argue that an implicit message exists in just our at-
tempt to test the degree of self-authorship among judges. Judges who 
do not author their own opinions will feel unfairly stigmatized, the 
argument goes, when it is not clear that they should. Judging is sup-
posed to be about applying the law to the facts in an impartial and 
considerate manner. Whether the articulation of that application is 
                                                                                                                     
 43. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 44. See Richard Lacayo, Inside the Court, TIME, July 13, 1992, at 29; Edward Lazarus, Disturb-
ing Truths, Jurist: Books-on-Law (July 1998), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revjul98.htm. The 
claim that liberal law clerks have had excessive influence on the Justices was also famously 
made years earlier by Justice Rehnquist (prior to his joining the Court). See Wahlbeck et al., 
supra note 42, at 167. The controversy that ensued led one conservative Senator to ask for 
clerk confirmation by the Senate. Id. 
 45. On Learned Hand’s use of his law clerks in the opinion-writing process, his former 
law clerk, Gerald Gunther, wrote: “No clerk for [Learned] Hand ever wrote a single word, 
either in producing research memoranda or in drafting opinions. Instead, the Hand-law 
clerk relationship was one of extraordinary intellectual intimacy: it consisted entirely of 
face-to-face contacts, not any written work.” Gerald Gunther, Reflections on Judicial Ad-
ministration in the Second Circuit, from the Perspective of Learned Hand’s Days, 60 
BROOK. L. REV. 505, 510 (1994). On Posner, see supra note 6. And on Douglas, see Richard 
A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, at 27 (reviewing BRUCE ALLEN 
MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS (2003)).   
 46. See supra note 42 (citing statements by former Marshall clerks).  
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self-authored or not is a consideration of minimal value, at best.47 
The identity of the author does not matter, and for us to suggest oth-
erwise by making this inquiry is disrespectful.  
 We disagree. One may not want judicial or author identity to be 
relevant, but there is reason to think that it is. Judges have individ-
ual preferences and respond to incentives. There is debate about the 
degree to which judges, as a specific subgroup, are driven by these 
factors, as opposed to other factors such as the norms of their profes-
sion or altruism toward society.48 Given that debate, the necessary 
next step should be to test the robustness of the competing models, 
and that requires collecting information on variables such as author-
ship.49 It may be that the empirical results will pleasantly surprise 
our critics and authorship identity will turn out not to matter. And if 
that is the case, there will not be any stigma. On the other hand, if 
self-authorship is related to productivity, quality, and other factors of 
importance, then a stigma should arguably fall on those judges who 
do not author their own opinions. 
2.   Imperfect Measurement 
 A second criticism takes aim at our methodology. Our critics point 
out that the types of statistical tests that we describe later in the Es-
say can at best produce an imperfect measure of authorship rates. 
Given that judges themselves have perfect information about their 
authorship levels, why not simply ask them about their practices? 
The point is fair. Judges do know more about their own practices, 
and we should try to ask them about what they do. But doing that 
alone is unlikely to be sufficient for two reasons. First, judges may 
choose simply not to respond to a survey instrument, especially if it 
is from some annoying law professor. Indeed, judges seemed irate 
when requested to respond to a survey sent out by the Senate’s Judi-
                                                                                                                     
 47. John Orth makes this point in his critique of our prior article where he says that 
any evaluation of judges should focus first on the quality of decisions (or justice) from the 
perspective of the individual litigants and only then, if at all, on considerations about the 
quality and style of the articulation. See Orth, supra note 15.  
 48. See Smyth, supra note 14, at 1302-09 (describing the debate). 
 49. There is already a literature on testing the different models of judging in law, 
economics, and political science, with contributions to that literature having been made by 
participants in this Symposium, including Brudney, Epstein, Farber, Posner, Smyth, 
Staudt, and Taha. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Perform-
ance Criteria and the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1015 
(2005); Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145 (2005); Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court 
Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1175 (2005); 
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005); Russell Smyth, supra note 14; Ahmed E. Taha, Information and 
the Selection of Judges: A Comment on “A Tournament of Judges,” 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1401 (2005). Our point is that information about authorship rates has the potential to im-
prove those tests.  
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ciary Oversight Subcommittee.50 Second, there is a verifiability prob-
lem with judges self-reporting their practices. What’s to stop a judge 
from saying that she writes all her opinions (whether true or not)? 
Judges could ameliorate the verifiability problem somewhat by allow-
ing their clerks free reign to disclose delegation practices. But we 
think this unlikely to happen. 
 Imperfect measures using computational techniques might be able 
to partially solve these problems by creating both an incentive to self-
report and a verifiability mechanism. In other words, the revelation 
of partial information by an outside source may create an incentive 
for the possessor of the true information to fully reveal it, if only to 
correct the imperfect impression left from objective data on author-
ship.51 If the imperfect information is seen as having a high degree of 
reliability (for example, it is correct seventy percent of the time), 
then that will put pressure on judges who rank low on the imperfect 
measure, but whose true scores should be higher, to self-report their 
true practices. And to the extent there is a perceived verifiability 
problem with self-reporting, the judges may allow for verifiability 
through mechanisms like clerk disclosure.  
III.   TESTING AUTHORSHIP 
 So far, we have assumed that authorship identity could be deter-
mined. In theory it can be, but the task is not straightforward. In-
deed, prior attempts at surveys on this very information have re-
vealed little other than the fact that many judges do delegate some 
portion of the writing task to their clerks.52 In this Part we describe 
                                                                                                                     
 50. See infra note 52 (discussing the survey attempt). The Grassley survey may not be 
the best example, though. The judges’ annoyance at Senator Grassley’s attempt to survey 
them may have been more a product of the somewhat undiplomatic tone and context of 
that particular survey attempt. See infra note 52.   
 51. For more on the argument that objective tournaments may help force participants 
to reveal information about themselves, see Scott Baker, Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, The 
Rat Race as an Information Forcing Device, 81 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649083. 
 52. There was a survey attempt directed by Senator Charles Grassley in 1996 as part 
of his work as chair of the Senate-Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight 
and the Courts. See U.S. SENATE-JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OVERSIGHT & THE 
COURTS, 104TH CONG. REPORT ON THE JANUARY 1996 JUDICIAL SURVEY (PART I, U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEAL) 26-27 (Comm. Print 1996) [hereinafter SURVEY REPORT]. He sent a 
survey to all sitting federal judges that inquired about matters such as delegation to law 
clerks. See Now the Judges Face the Questions, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 8 (providing 
the full text of the Grassley questionnaire). The survey results suggested that most judges 
did not perceive an inappropriate level of delegation. See SURVEY REPORT, supra, at 26-27. 
(reporting that over seventy-five percent of the circuit court judges did not perceive a prob-
lem with the extent of delegation to law clerks); Oyez Surveys, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, 
at 3 (reporting that Grassley’s “results show that most judges believe that law clerks do 
not play too large a role in judicial decision making”); Deborah Pines & Bill Alden, District, 
Circuit Judges Use Senate Survey to Boast, Gripe, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at 1, 4 (report-
ing that Judge Newman responded to the question of how much he delegated work to law 
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our preliminary attempts to determine authorship through other 
techniques.  
 The literature on the question of tracing authorship dates back to 
over a century ago. In recent years, these techniques have made it 
onto television talk shows and the front page of The New York 
Times.53 Stories have appeared about their application in the discov-
ery of a new Shakespeare poem and in a variety of other high-profile 
settings, such as unmasking the anonymous author of Primary Col-
ors.54 Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors have also used “fo-
rensic linguistics” in both the JonBenét Ramsey murder investigation 
and the Unabomber prosecution.55  
 In attempting to answer these questions and others—such as 
whether Shakespeare wrote his plays or if they were really the work 
of Marlowe, Bacon, or some other contemporary—scholars have de-
                                                                                                                     
clerks by saying that he does “not believe that law clerks exercise anything that can rea-
sonably be called ‘power’”).  
 The survey caused considerable displeasure among many judges. See, e.g., Bruce Brown, 
Grassley Has Judges Grousing, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 16 (reporting that “Grassley’s cru-
sade has many judges grumbling”); Pines & Alden, supra, at 4 (quoting Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who characterized the survey as potentially “an unwarranted and ill-considered 
effort to micromanage the work of the federal judiciary,” and stating that the survey’s in-
quiry into delegation practices particularly had “raise[d] the ire of judges”). Given this dis-
pleasure, the response rate of over fifty percent was surprisingly high—approximately 600 
judges returned the surveys. See Pines & Alden, supra, at 4 (reporting that over 600 out of 
1148 judges had responded to the survey). Despite the high response rate, neither this nor 
other survey attempts have come anywhere close to estimating relative levels of clerk con-
tributions in the different chambers in a meaningful manner. See Wahlbeck et al., supra 
note 42, at 168 (making this point about prior survey attempts).  
 53. See William H. Honan, A Sleuth Gets His Suspect: Shakespeare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
14, 1996, § 1, at 1 (discussing Professor Donald Foster’s efforts to trace authorship).  
 54. Much of the media scrutiny regarding what is sometimes referred to as “forensic lin-
guistics” has centered around the work of Vassar College professor Don Foster. Many of Foster’s 
exploits, including those mentioned in the text, are detailed in DON FOSTER, AUTHOR 
UNKNOWN: ON THE TRAIL OF ANONYMOUS (2000). For more on Foster’s exploits, including The 
New York Times front-page story, his unmasking of Joe Klein for New York Magazine, and his 
confrontation with Dan Rather on CBS, see Jamie Allen, On the Trail of a Literary Sleuth, 
CNN.COM, Dec. 6, 2000, at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/books/news/12/06/foster.anonymous/.  
The discovery of the Shakespeare poem that brought Foster his initial fame, though, was later 
recanted by Foster. See William S. Niederkorn, A Scholar Recants on His ‘Shakespeare’ Discov-
ery, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at E1. Stronger evidence pointing to John Ford as the author of 
the poem, A Funeral Elegy, was subsequently reported by Professor Gilles Monsarrat. Id. Fos-
ter’s error, apparently, was to focus excessively on word usage patterns and not enough on 
structural features such as phrase patterns. See id. (reporting criticisms by Cambridge Profes-
sor Brian Vickers).  
 For more sophisticated linguistic treatments of the arguments over the authorship of 
Funeral Elegy, see BRIAN VICKERS, ‘COUNTERFEITING’ SHAKESPEARE: EVIDENCE, 
AUTHORSHIP, AND JOHN FORD’S FUNERALL ELEGYE (2002); Ward Elliott & Robert Valenza, 
Smoking Guns and Silver Bullets: Could John Ford Have Written the Funeral Elegy?, 16 
LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 205 (2001); and G.D. Monsarrat, A Funeral Elegy: 
Ford, W.S., and Shakespeare, 53 REV. ENG. STUD. 186 (2002). 
 55. See Allen, supra note 54 (summarizing Foster’s help to the FBI); FOSTER, supra 
note 54, at 16-17 (providing a brief discussion of the Ramsey murder investigation); id. at 
95-142 (explaining Foster’s contributions to the Unabomber investigation).  
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veloped a number of techniques.56 We make use of these techniques 
in discerning authorship for judicial opinions. Although some linguis-
tics tools have found their way into FBI investigations and even into 
court,57 few legal academics have made any meaningful use of them 
in their research on judicial authorship.58 One reason for the lack of 
research is resource-related.59 In addition, determining authorship is 
difficult without a set of authentic texts for each judge (for example, 
texts where it is known to a certainty that the judge is the author) 
against which to compare the judicial opinions bearing the judge’s 
name. 
 There has been, however, at least one attempt to determine au-
thorship in the judicial context. Paul Wahlbeck, James Spriggs, and 
Lee Sigelman used techniques from computational linguistics to de-
termine the relative levels of delegation of the opinion-writing task to 
clerks by Justices Lewis Powell and Thurgood Marshall.60 We con-
sider whether some version of that method could be used to deter-
mine authorship patterns for a larger sample of judges. 
 To get a sense of the difficulty of tackling this question and as a 
preliminary test of the effectiveness of standard authorship method-
ologies in determining judicial opinion authorship, we ran our au-
thorship tests on a sample consisting of opinions for all the active 
federal circuit court judges for the period from January 1, 1998 to 
December 31, 2000—a total of three years worth of data.  
 Our tentative conclusion: the ranking task can be accomplished, 
but it requires a significant allocation of resources—at least more 
than the minimal amounts that law faculty typically use on their pro-
                                                                                                                     
 56. Inquiries into the authorship of Shakespearean texts have been multitudinous. 
For a discussion of some examples, see Barron Brainerd, The Computer in Statistical Stud-
ies of William Shakespeare, 4 COMPUTER STUD. HUMAN. & VERBAL BEHAV. 9 (1973), and 
C.B. Williams, Mendenhall’s Studies of Word-Length Distribution in the Works of Shake-
speare and Bacon, 62 BIOMETRIKA 207 (1975). For more on inquiries into the true author-
ship of the texts we attribute to Shakespeare, see Ward Elliot, The Shakespeare Clinic, 
ELLIOT ONLINE, at http://govt.mckenna.edu/welliott/shakes.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005), 
and THE SHAKESPEARE AUTHORSHIP PAGE, at http://shakespeareauthorship.com (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2005). 
 57. See FOSTER, supra note 54, at 95-142 (describing the use of his techniques by both 
the FBI and the prosecutors in the Unabomber case); see also Bryan Niblett & Jillian 
Boreham, Cluster Analysis in Court, 1976 CRIM. L. REV. 175 (describing how the “cluster 
analysis” technique is used to verify criminal confession statements).  
 58. We should note though that at least two sets of legal scholars have discussed fo-
rensic linguistics in other contexts. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, 
SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 149-80 (2005) (discussing the 
application of authorship attribution research to a wide variety of criminal investigations 
and cases); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND 
POWER 161-78 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing Donald Foster’s involvement in the JonBenét Ram-
sey murder investigation). 
 59. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88 (describing time-intensive nature of our 
authorship methodology).  
 60. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 170-73. 
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jects. Moreover, significant “noise” may exist in comparing author-
ship of different judicial opinions that may make determining the 
true level of authorship for a particular set of opinions for any par-
ticular judge difficult. Nonetheless, the same reasons we offer in Part 
II.A of this Essay to support the value of determining authorship lead 
us to believe that more research is warranted in the area.  
 In Part III.A, we give a thumbnail sketch of the methodology used 
for doing authorship testing. In Part III.B, we then examine the 
question of how that methodology might be applied to the matter of 
ranking judges, and we provide results from generic tests of author-
ship drawn from computational linguistics. The generic tests perform 
poorly in distinguishing judges based on authorship. In Part III.C, we 
then report the results from better-tailored tests of authorship for the 
judicial context. Tests that control for the subject matter of judicial 
opinions perform better in assessing judicial authorship. 
A.   Tracking Judicial Fingerprints 
 The basic proposition here is that writers have styles of their own. 
Just as all of us have our own styles of walking, talking, singing, 
shooting a photograph or movie, throwing a baseball, and playing a 
guitar, we also have particular writing styles. Some of us have styles 
that are more distinctive than others. This is especially true when we 
are experts in a field and, as a result, are extensively active within 
the field. Michael Jordan’s style of shooting a basketball, Serena Wil-
liams’ style of serving a tennis ball, and Sachin Tedulkar’s style of 
hitting a cricket ball are so distinctive that even casual fans are 
likely to identify the players from just their playing styles. Our more 
literate friends can readily recognize passages from authors such as 
Jane Austen, Ernest Hemmingway, and F. Scott Fitzgerald.     
 Testing authorship by way of an author’s idiosyncratic style re-
quires distilling the basic elements of the style that differ from that 
of other authors in order that these basic elements can be used as 
identifiers. For example, if one knows that author A is partial to us-
ing the word “hath” and intensely dislikes the word “have,” one might 
think it unlikely a document that has zero uses of “hath” and multi-
ple uses of “have” belongs to him. The information about author A’s 
distinctive style characteristics is combined with information about 
the patterns in the document of unknown authorship, and Bayes’ 
Theorem is used to determine the probability that A authored the 
mystery text.61 
                                                                                                                     
 61. The standard technique to make these probability calculations is to use Bayes’ 
Theorem. One of the problems with the use of the naïve Bayes model that has been pointed 
out is that the calculation assumes randomness (and, of course, words in a text are a function 
of each other as opposed to completely independent and random). Nevertheless, despite the 
1100  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1077 
 
 The problem with this technique is that one has to identify a large 
set of unique identifiers (such as uses of “hath” in place of “have”). 
Without such a set of identifiers, it becomes difficult to distinguish 
authors from one another. Relying on unique stylistic markers also 
requires expertise in identifying the author’s style and will work only 
for authors who have developed identifiable traits in the first place. 
This narrows considerably the usefulness of such techniques. Not all 
authors use unique stylistic markers in their writing (Choi and Gu-
lati, for example, are quite mundane in their styles, although they 
are both partial to text parentheticals). 
 More broadly applicable techniques for authorship determination 
build on the same basic idea but look to a variety of style patterns 
rather than particular identifiers. Here, the premise is that authors’ 
writings follow patterns. These patterns may be, in part, a function of 
stylistic preferences, such as the use of the word “hath.” Patterns 
may also consist of the use of a series of more common words and the 
order in which such words are used. Rather than look for specific 
styles, authorship may be determined through an examination of the 
overall frequency of specific words and patterns of words throughout 
the entire text. 
 Word choice patterns (that is, diction) are also likely to be a func-
tion of bounded rationality. People engaged in the task of writing, 
just as with other tasks, are constrained by their cognitive capacities. 
There is likely to be a finite set of words that are part of a single in-
dividual’s active vocabulary. One uses these words more often than 
other words. Other words, though part of one’s vocabulary, are used 
only rarely in one’s own speech or writing yet are immediately recog-
nizable in both the text and speech of others. And then there will be 
words the author simply does not know. Individual authors are likely 
to exhibit distinct patterns of noun and verb usage, distinct patterns 
                                                                                                                     
likely violation of the randomness assumption, the naïve Bayes model appears to perform well. 
For discussions of Bayes’ Theorem, see James Joyce, Bayes’ Theorem, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem (last sub-
stantive content change Sept. 30, 2003). For a Bayes’ Theorem calculator, see VASSARSTATS, 
BAYES’ THEOREM: CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES, at http://faculty.vassar.edu/lowry/bayes.html 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005). On the use of the Bayes model, see FREDERICK MOSTELLER & DAVID 
L. WALLACE, APPLIED BAYESIAN AND CLASSICAL INFERENCE: THE CASE OF THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS (2d ed. 1984). See also Sang-Bum Kim et al., Effective Methods for Improving Naïve 
Bayes Text Classifiers, PRICAI 2002: TRENDS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 7TH PACIFIC RIM 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, TOKYO, JAPAN (M. Ishizuka & A. 
Sattar eds., 2002); Andrew McCallum & Kamal Nigam, A Comparison of Event Models for Na-
ïve Bayes Text Classification, in AM. ASS’N FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEARNING FOR TEXT 
CATEGORIZATION: PAPERS FROM THE AAAI WORKSHOP, TECHNICAL REPORT WS-98-05, at 41 
(1998); Yiming Yang, An Evaluation of Statistical Approaches to Text Categorization, 1 INFO. 
RETRIEVAL 69 (1999). More generally, for both a discussion and application of a variety of these 
methods of authorship recognition, see Michael G. Farringdon, A Stylometric Analysis, in 
MARTIN C. BATTESTIN, NEW ESSAYS BY HENRY FIELDING: HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
CRAFTSMAN (1734-1739) AND OTHER EARLY JOURNALISM app. C, at 549-62 (1989). 
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for combining words, and distinct patterns of starting and ending 
sentences. All of these patterns can translate into frequency of use. 
Given a set of authentic texts for any author, a full set of these fre-
quencies can be calculated. These frequencies can then be compared 
to the frequency patterns for the document whose authorship is un-
known to determine whether the same author wrote the document in 
question.62 
 Among the first serious treatments of the mathematics of word 
distributions, to our knowledge, was that by G. Udny Yule in 1938, in 
a study of The Imitation of Christ.63 The defining studies in the area, 
however, are four studies published in the 1960s: Louis Milic’s tests 
of Jonathan Swift’s prose,64 A.Q. Morton and James McLeman’s 
study of the Pauline Epistles,65 Alvar Ellegård’s study of the Junius 
Letters,66 and Frederick Mosteller and David Wallace’s work on The 
Federalist papers.67 The success of these projects and improvements 
of computer technology spurred an expansion of the literature on 
style statistics in the decades since. For interested scholars, extended 
treatments and a steady stream of sophisticated journal articles ex-
ist.68 
                                                                                                                     
 62. See Farringdon, supra note 61 (describing a range of techniques used to determine 
authorship). For an overview of the state of authorship attribution studies and the wide 
range of techniques in use, see Joseph Rudman, The State of Authorship Attribution Stud-
ies: Some Problems and Solutions, 31 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 351 (1998). 
 63. See Farringdon, supra note 61, at 549-50; see also G. UDNY YULE, THE 
STATISTICAL STUDY OF LITERARY VOCABULARY (1944) (investigating the measurement of 
word distribution). Prior to Yule, there is the suggestion that stylistic habits might be used 
to detect authorship in a letter from the mathematician Augustus De Morgan in 1851. See 
Farringdon, supra note 61, at 549 (citing SOPHIE ELIZABETH DE MORGAN, MEMOIR OF 
AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN 215-16 (1882)). There is also the work on frequency distributions of 
words by Zipf in 1932. See GEORGE KINGSLEY ZIPF, SELECTED STUDIES OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF RELATIVE FREQUENCY IN LANGUAGE (1932).  
 64. LOUIS TONKO MILIC, A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH TO THE STYLE OF JONATHAN 
SWIFT (1967).  
 65. A.Q. MORTON & JAMES MCLEMAN, PAUL, THE MAN AND THE MYTH: A STUDY IN 
THE AUTHORSHIP OF GREEK PROSE (1966).  
 66. ALVAR ELLEGÅRD, A STATISTICAL METHOD FOR DETERMINING AUTHORSHIP: THE 
JUNIUS LETTERS, 1769-1772 (1962).  
 67. MOSTELLER & WALLACE, supra note 61; FREDERICK MOSTELLER & DAVID L. 
WALLACE, INFERENCE AND DISPUTED AUTHORSHIP: THE FEDERALIST (1964).  
 68. Among the extended treatments or collections of articles are J.F. BURROWS, 
COMPUTATION INTO CRITICISM: A STUDY OF JANE AUSTEN’S NOVELS AND AN EXPERIMENT IN 
METHOD (1987); THE COMPUTER IN LITERARY AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES (Alan Jones & R.F. 
Churchhouse eds., 1976); PAULA R. FELDMAN & BUFORD NORMAN, THE WORDWORTHY 
COMPUTER: CLASSROOM AND RESEARCH APPLICATIONS IN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE 
(1987); ANTHONY KENNY, THE COMPUTATION OF STYLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS 
FOR STUDENTS OF LITERATURE AND HUMANITIES (1982); LITERARY COMPUTING AND 
LITERARY CRITICISM: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ESSAYS ON THEME AND RHETORIC (Ro-
sanne G. Potter ed., 1989); and A.Q. MORTON, LITERARY DETECTION: HOW TO PROVE 
AUTHORSHIP AND FRAUD IN LITERATURE AND DOCUMENTS (1978). Current articles in the 
field can be found in the journals Literary and Linguistic Computing and Computers and 
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 The question, then, is whether these techniques can be applied to 
judicial opinions. The answer is not obviously in the affirmative.   
 The fact that Jane Austen’s or Ernest Hemmingway’s texts have 
distinctive styles and are easily recognizable does not mean that the 
writing styles of more ordinary mortals will be recognizable. More-
over, testing judicial authorship is potentially even more problematic 
because of the institutionalized nature of judicial writing. To the ex-
tent that judges consciously try to follow some institutional style 
(and, therefore, consciously suppress their own style), the difficulties 
in identifying particular judicial authorship are likely further exac-
erbated.69 Our project, however, is to identify the degree of judge au-
thorship versus clerk authorship.  
 There is reason to believe that judicial style is likely to be differ-
ent from clerk style. Judges, who tend to have been experienced law-
yers or academics earlier in their careers, are likely to be more confi-
dent in their writing than their clerks, who tend to be fresh out of 
law schools. Judges, because of their high level of skill and confi-
dence, may write shorter opinions with fewer citations and footnotes. 
Judges also are likely to attack the central issue in their cases di-
rectly. Clerks, by contrast, because of their inexperience, may tend to 
write lengthy opinions with numerous citations and footnotes.70 
 As noted earlier, the sole application of the linguistic techniques 
discussed above to the question of judicial delegation to law clerks is 
the paper by Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Sigelman.71 Court lore has it 
that Justice Thurgood Marshall delegated writing tasks heavily to 
his law clerks, whereas Justice Lewis Powell was more actively in-
volved in the production of opinions.72 Wahlbeck and his coauthors 
attempted to use information available from the Justices’ papers, 
                                                                                                                     
the Humanities. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 189 n.14 (suggesting these two jour-
nals and a number of the volumes mentioned above for background in statistical stylistics).  
 69. For a discussion of the types of judicial opinion styles and the background litera-
ture, see Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s Appellate 
Opinions, 1981-82—Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordinary 
Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 656-76 (2000).  
 70. The point that overreliance on law clerks can significantly influence the style of 
opinions has been made by a number of commentators. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 94 
(making the point that delegation of opinion writing to law clerks can affect the clarity and 
style of the opinion); POSNER, supra note 41, at 115 (suggesting that the excessive numbers 
of footnotes, citations, and words in opinions are all a product of heightened levels of dele-
gation to law clerks); Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 173 (making the point that clerks 
are more likely than judges to rely extensively on multifactor and balancing tests in the 
opinions that they draft) (citing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993), and 
POSNER, supra note 3). But see Samuel Estreicher, Conserving the Federal Judiciary for a 
Conservative Agenda?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 569, 574 (1986) (agreeing that law clerks may be 
partially responsible for the excessive numbers of footnotes and the deadening style of cur-
rent opinions but also stating that part of the blame may also lie with computerization).  
 71. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42. 
 72. See id. at 170-72; see also sources cited supra note 42.  
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containing clerk identifiers on bench memoranda and draft opinions, 
to see whether they could detect the “fingerprints” of the clerks in the 
opinions with which the two Justices were involved.73 The greater the 
involvement of the Justice in the actual drafting, they hypothesized, 
the less likely it would be that the fingerprints of the clerks would be 
detectable.74 In order to perform the detection task, they used eight 
different frequency measures.75 These were average footnote length, 
average sentence length, average word length, word length diversity, 
sentence length diversity, footnote frequency, type-token ratio, and 
the once-word rate.76 Consistent with their initial hypothesis, Wahl-
beck, Spriggs, and Sigelman found that the fingerprints of judicial 
clerks are clearer in Marshall’s opinions than in Powell’s opinions. 
This implied that Powell had a greater hand in authoring his own ju-
dicial opinions.77     
 We attempt to adapt the authorship methodology used in compu-
tational linguistics to the task of ranking authorship rates for judges. 
We note, however, several important points. Ideally, we could per-
form the following two step methodology: 
 Step 1: Run the authorship methodology on a set of authentic writ-
ing samples from a particular judge to serve as the baseline of com-
parison. 
 Step 2: Compare the judge’s judicial opinions against the authen-
tic writing samples to determine whether the judge in fact authored 
the opinions. The greater the discrepancy between the opinions and 
the authentic writing samples, the less likely the probability that the 
particular judge authored the opinions. 
 For most judges, there is unlikely to be an available set of authen-
tic samples of the judge’s own writing that can be used to calculate 
baseline frequencies.78 We therefore are unable to determine how 
many of a particular judge’s opinions the judge actually wrote.  
 Nonetheless, at least two uses for the authorship methodology are 
possible in judge-related authorship studies. First, we can make a 
comparison of a subset of a particular judge’s opinions to each other. 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 168, 178-82.  
 74. See id. at 174.  
 75. Id. at 176-77.  
 76. Id. Type-token ratio is “the number of different words in an opinion (types) as a 
percentage of the total number of words in the opinion (tokens).” Id. at 176. Once-word re-
fers to “the relative frequency of words that appear exactly once in an opinion.” Id.  
 77. Id. at 182-83.  
 78. For a subset of judges such as former law professors, we can find articles that they 
authored. There are two problems with using these articles as the basis for opinion testing. 
First, article writing is a different genre from opinion writing; and second, law review edi-
tors are involved in article writing. That said, since it is these same law review editors who 
often become law clerks, maybe opinion styles and law review article styles are more simi-
lar than we think.  
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Assuming that consistency in the sentence patterns and other as-
pects of an author’s style is positively correlated with authentic au-
thorship, one can then rank the judges relatively against one another. 
If the judge authored all the opinions, presumably the opinions will 
receive a high same-authorship score. If the judge did not author all 
of the opinions, then the set of opinions will receive a low same-
authorship score.  
 This variation measure across a set of opinions for which a par-
ticular judge is named as the author, it should be cautioned, will pro-
vide a high score for a judge who delegates all her work to a single, 
permanent law clerk.79 It would also likely give higher scores to 
judges who imposed their styles on the writing process by doing 
heavy editing as opposed to doing any of the actual writing. What we 
would be measuring, then, is best described as the relative degree of 
various judges’ involvement in the writing process. 
 Second, we can use the authorship methodology to make relative 
comparisons of how authorship for a particular judge has changed 
over time. We may not know if Judge A authors her opinions or not. 
But we can see if the level of authorship (regardless of the starting 
point) has declined or increased over time. Consider Supreme Court 
Justices. One hypothesis is that as individual Justices age, they play 
a diminishing role in writing their own opinions or, alternatively, in 
monitoring the work product of their clerks.80 We could compare the 
authorship score for a particular Justice when in her fifties against 
the authorship score when in her eighties. If the hypothesis is cor-
rect, one would expect to see a relative drop in the same-authorship 
score.  
 In this Essay we discuss only the first application of the author-
ship methodology to ranking judges (the judge versus judge compari-
son). Doing a full-scale ranking of any meaningful sample of judges is 
beyond the scope of this project—and our research budgets. We do, 
however, briefly report the results of some preliminary tests and dis-
cuss the limitations of our methodology as well as possible adjust-
ments to improve on our work. We leave for another paper the com-
parison of judges relative to their past selves.81 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Such a result is unlikely, nonetheless, where the sample of opinions for a judge 
are drawn across multiple years (and thus involve multiple different sets of clerks).  
 80. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3 (manuscript at ch. 5, at 11) (reporting evidence 
on how the authorship patterns of Justices such as Rehnquist and Blackmun changed over 
their time on the Court, with both Justices delegating more of the opinion writing to clerks 
as they gained seniority).    
 81. We are in the process of collecting these data now.  
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B.   Ranking Judges 
 To test authorship rates, we start with a set of generic tests com-
monly used in other studies of authorship. We do not control for dif-
ferent types of documents in the generic tests but take instead a ran-
domly selected set of opinions for a judge and compare them to one 
another. We label these generic tests our “black-box” tests because of 
the lack of subject matter controls. 
 The two black-box tests that we use are recognized authorship-
testing methods—only two out of a variety of tests available.82 We de-
scribe them briefly before discussing the results of the tests. We rely 
primarily on the GZip compression technique, which compresses 
documents based on the similarities in the basic linguistic building 
blocks of the two files.83 The GZip algorithm looks for repeated 
phrases within a threshold of the last 8000 characters of text ana-
lyzed (a number that can be made larger, depending on the specific 
program). The longer and more frequent the repeated phrases, the 
higher the score the algorithm accords to the text; the end result is 
greater compression.  
                                                                                                                     
 82. Among the many authorship attribution techniques are reduction of authorship 
style to a single defining number, Markov chains, cumulative sums, and syntactic annota-
tion. On these various methods, see Dmitri V. Khmelev & Fiona J. Tweedie, Using Markov 
Chains for Identification of Writers, 16 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 299 (2001); Mi-
chael L. Hilton & David I. Homes, An Assessment of Cumulative Sum Charts for Author-
ship Attribution, 8 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 73 (1993); George K. Barr, The 
Cusum Mechanism—A Review of Analysing for Authorship by Jill M. Farringdon, 6 
EXPERT EVIDENCE 43 (1998); Harald Baayen et al., Outside the Cave of Shadows: Using 
Syntactic Annotation to Enhance Authorship Attribution, 11 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC 
COMPUTING 121 (1996); and Tony Honoré, Some Simple Measures of Richness of Vocabu-
lary, 7 ASS’N LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING BULL. 172 (1979).  
 83. In using and applying the GZip method, we relied on the computer scientists at In-
App software company in Trivandrum, India—Satish Babu, M.C. Jayakrishnan, and R.V. 
Suchithra—who consulted with colleagues at the computer science department at Kerala 
University to develop a simple application of the GZip method for our project. Should readers 
be interested in more details on the GZip application, please email questions to: Satish Babu, 
sb@inapp.com; M.C. Jayakrishnan, jayan@inapp.com; or R.V. Suchitra, suchi@inapp.com. 
Our use of the compression method to test authorship is simplistic. For discussions of far 
more sophisticated applications of the compression methodology to test for authorship that 
are beyond the mathematics and statistics skills of the two authors here, see, for example, 
Dario Benedetto et al., Language Trees and Zipping, 88 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 048702-1 
(2002); Eibe Frank et al., Text Categorization Using Compression Models, in PROCEEDINGS: 
DCC 2000 DATA COMPRESSION CONFERENCE 555 (James A. Storer & Martin Cohn eds., 2000); 
D.V. Khmelev, Disputed Authorship Resolution Through Using Relative Empirical Entropy 
for Markov Chains of Letters in Human Language Texts, 7 J. QUANTITATIVE LINGUISTICS 201 
(2000); O.V. Kukushkina et al., Using Literal and Grammatical Statistics for Authorship At-
tribution, 37 PROBS. INFO. TRANSMISSION 172 (2001); and William J. Teahan & David J. 
Harper, Using Compression-Based Language Models for Text Categorization (2001), available 
at http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/teahan01using.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). Simphile, a pro-
gram from Geneffects, is a commercial implementation of author recognition, using the same 
technique. The methodology has also reportedly been used for gene sequence matching in bio-
informatics and authorship of music and art. For more information, see GENEFFECTS, 
SIMPHILE, at http://www.geneffects.com/simphile (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).  
1106  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1077 
 
 Compression serves as a metric for redundancy or “entropy”84 and, 
as a result, is a metric for comparing authorship. The compression for 
a combined file containing an English document combined with an 
Italian one, for example, will be significantly less than that of a com-
bined file containing two similar length documents in English.85 Along 
those lines, research suggests that the compression of files from the 
same authors will be significantly greater than that of files from dif-
ferent authors (due to the greater number of repeated phrases). 
 We can calculate a compression score for any two documents (la-
beled A and B) as follows: 
 Compression Score = P/Q 
 where: 
   Size(·) = The size in bytes of the compressed file  
 P = Size(Document A) + Size(Document B)  
 Q = Size(Documents A combined with B) 
 P is always greater than Q. If documents A and B are written by 
the same author, we assert that P will be much greater than Q. Put 
another way, if documents A and B display many similarities, com-
pressing the combination of the two documents will result in signifi-
cant space savings when compared with the compression of each 
document separately. On the other hand, if the documents are writ-
ten by different authors, P will, in the extreme, approach Q (as the 
compression program will find fewer common phrases between the 
documents). If documents A and B are completely different, then 
combining the two will result in no additional compression. 
 For each of the ninety-eight judges in our sample, we collected 
four text samples of 8000 characters each. Text samples were chosen 
at random from opinions at least 32,000 characters in length that 
were written between 1998 and 2000.86 In our black-box tests, we did 
not control for the subject matter of the opinion. A particular judge 
may have four criminal law opinions or, alternatively, a set of crimi-
                                                                                                                     
 84. For a discussion on the meaning of entropy in the context of authorship, see 
Benedetto et al., supra note 83, at 048702-1 to 048702-2.  
 85. See id. at 048702-2.  
 86. The actual selection of files to run the tests was made at random by the program-
mers at InApp, with no interference from us other than the request that the selection be 
made randomly (using a random number generator to select four opinions for each judge). 
The only possible bias in the selection of the opinions is in their size, in that the opinions in 
our selection pool had to have a minimum size of 32,000 characters (because that size 
would generally yield at least 8000 characters after cleaning). This was not a problem in 
terms of majority opinions because most judges have a large number of opinions of 32,000 
characters. But when we attempted to run the program on dissenting opinions we ran into 
the bias problem because most judges had very few dissenting opinions of 32,000 charac-
ters or more. For that reason, we did not attempt to do a full study of the differences be-
tween dissents and majority opinions, something that could potentially yield interesting 
results. See infra note 89 (discussing how the comparison of scores on dissents versus those 
on majority opinions could serve as a test of the methodology). 
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nal, constitutional, commercial, and securities-regulatory opinions. 
As we discuss below, however, this lack of control for the type of opin-
ion may introduce genre-specific “noise” in our results. The compres-
sion score for four criminal law opinions from a judge who does not 
write her own opinions may be greater (leading to a higher same-
authorship score) than the score for four opinions from different ar-
eas of the law for a judge who does in fact write her own opinions. 
 Since the goal was to test authorship style, we eliminated all por-
tions of the documents that were not a product of this style. That 
meant removing all West headnotes, citations, and quotes from each 
document. Commonly used words such as “and” and “the” were also 
eliminated.87 Cleaning the documents was the most time-consuming 
task in this project because it had to be done manually. It took us 500-
plus hours of research-assistant time to clean the pieces of text that 
satisfied our conditions for each of the ninety-eight judges in our sam-
ple. Cleaning the documents is not strictly required but does reduce 
the level of noise in the same-authorship score results, since, for ex-
ample, two judges with dramatically different levels of “true” author-
ship may receive the same GZip score if the compression of the words 
“and” and “the” swamp all other differences between the documents. 
 We then made pairwise comparisons of these four pieces of text 
(labeled A1, A2, A3, and A4 below) and generated a four-by-four ma-
trix for each judge with P/Q scores for each of the pairs:  
A1, A1 A1, A2 A1, A3 A1, A4 
A2, A1 A2, A2 A2, A3 A2, A4 
A3, A1 A3, A2 A3, A3 A3, A4 
A4, A1 A4, A2 A4, A3 A4, A4 
 Our goal was to measure the degree of variation in the writing 
style (here, measured by compression levels as determined using the 
GZip program). One measure of this variance is provided by the ei-
genvalue of the matrix.88 The higher the eigenvalue, the higher the 
probability of sole authorship. 
                                                                                                                     
 87. This is not to suggest that these commonly used words might not be useful with a 
different type of authorship test. One could, for example, run frequency tests on the rela-
tive uses of these common words, because different authors likely have different styles 
with respect to these words as well (some authors likely use more of them than others). 
One rationale for using measures of these “function” words (such as “and,” “the,” and “of”) 
is that the rate of their use is a function of the unconscious or habitual element of writing 
and, therefore, a better indicator of true authorship. For discussions, see J.F. Burrows, 
Word-Patterns and Story-Shapes: The Statistical Analysis of Narrative Style, 2 LITERARY & 
LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 61 (1987), and David L. Hoover, Statistical Stylistics and Author-
ship Attribution: An Empirical Investigation, 16 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 421 
(2001). 
 88. The four-by-four matrix of compression scores for each judge’s four opinions is 
symmetric, since P/Q will be the same for the pairs [A1, A2] and [A2, A1]. By definition, a 
symmetric square matrix possesses n real eigenvalues (where n is the order of the ma-
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 To test the effectiveness of the GZip methodology for determining 
judicial authorship, we identified a set of judges who, a priori, are 
known to write their own opinions—our “test” judges. An informal 
survey of more than two dozen judges and law clerks, who requested 
that we not name them, produced a high degree of agreement on the 
names of three federal circuit court judges who regularly author their 
opinions: Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Michael Boudin.89 
More specifically, we were told that Posner drafts every word of his 
opinions; that Easterbrook may allow his clerks to draft one or two 
opinions a year but drafts the remainder himself; and that Boudin 
uses a combination of very heavy editing of clerk drafts and self-
authorship. To reiterate, all three are reputed to fall on the high end 
of the scale of self-authorship. Assuming this informal information to 
be correct, the scores for these judges should be among the highest. If 
the GZip methodology is effective in identifying judges who author 
their own opinions, our three test judges should rank highly among 
our sample of ninety-eight judges. We do not perform the alternative 
test of identifying several judges reputed not to write their own opin-
ions and assessing whether the GZip methodology succeeds in assign-
ing a poor ranking to such judges. Unfortunately, for purposes of our 
tests, the judges and clerks we surveyed were reluctant to identify 
those least inclined to author their opinions.  
 We report in Table 1 below the ranking of the top fifteen judges 
out of our sample of ninety-eight judges based on the eigenvalue 
score from our GZip test. Higher eigenvalues correlate with a greater 
likelihood of self-authorship. In addition, we report the ranking of 
our three test judges.  
                                                                                                                     
trix). Eigenvalues have several applications. In this context, we use it as a single metric 
that measures the variability among the elements of the matrix. We borrowed the reason-
ing for using eigenvalues from factor analysis, where they are used to measure variability.  
 89. A fuller study would need to use additional controls, particularly if there is doubt 
about whether Posner, Easterbrook, and Boudin actually author the major portion of their 
own opinions. Two possible other controls are checking whether the authorship tests re-
turn higher scores for (a) dissents than for majority opinions, because informal information 
suggests that dissents are more personal to the judge and, we assume, more likely to be 
self-authored and (b) judges in the distant past than for judges of today, because judges in 
the distant past are reputed to have written a far larger fraction of their own opinions 
since they did not face the caseload pressures of current judges. We did not use either of 
these two controls because of inadequacies in our dataset. On the points about dissents be-
ing more personal and judges in the past writing more of their own opinions, see Blom-
quist, supra note 6, at 86-92 (discussing the characteristics of dissent styles); Richman & 
Reynolds, supra note 8, at 278-79 (discussing how the increases in caseloads from the time 
of Learned Hand to the present have resulted in increased levels of delegation of the opin-
ion-writing task); Frankel, supra note 3 (bemoaning the passing of the Leaned Hand style 
of opinion writing, where there was little delegation of the writing task to the law clerks); 
cf. Wahlbeck et al., supra note 42, at 168 (pointing out that the conventional view that 
judges in the past single-handedly crafted all their own opinions whereas today’s judges 
lean heavily on their clerks is an oversimplification, because there is evidence suggesting 
that clerks have long played a significant role in the opinion-drafting process).   
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TABLE 1 
RANKING BASED ON GZIP METHODOLOGY 
RANK JUDGE CIRCUIT OPINIONS EIGENVALUE 
1 Randolph, A. Raymond DC 169.01 
2 Ginsburg, Douglas H. DC 160.29 
3 Manion, Daniel A. 7 150.58 
4 Garza, Emilio M. 5 145.91 
5 McKee, Theodore A. 3 140.23 
6 Moore, Karen Nelson 6 139.44 
7 Tjoflat, Gerald Bard 11 137.95 
8 Batchelder, Alice M. 6 137.46 
9 Calabresi, Guido 2 137.03 
10 Flaum, Joel M. 7 135.83 
11 Walker, John M., Jr. 2 135.00 
12 Gilman, Ronald Lee 6 134.86 
13 Dennis, James L. 5 134.82 
14 DeMoss, Harold R., Jr. 5 134.57 
15 Ebel, David M. 10 134.48 
. . . . 
44 Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 130.19 
50 Posner, Richard A. 7 129.89 
97 Boudin, Michael 1 121.81 
 Somewhat surprisingly (and to our dismay after expending 500 
hours of resources), none of our three test judges show up as top scor-
ers on the GZip tests. Boudin, in fact, scores near the very bottom of 
the judges, and only Easterbrook is in the top half of judges.  
 We provide one variation on the GZip methodology. Instead of 
computing the eigenvalue of the four-by-four matrix of GZip scores, 
we classify the compression score for any two opinions for a particu-
lar judge as either high, middle, or low.90 We then look at the differ-
ence between the number of high compression scores (high likelihood 
of sole authorship) and the number of low compression scores (low 
                                                                                                                     
 90. We take the lower triangular numbers of the four-by-four matrix (the upper trian-
gular numbers can be ignored since the matrix is symmetric, while the diagonal can be ig-
nored since it represents a self-referential relation). The overall range of the P/Q compres-
sion numbers across all judges goes from 3.0 to 6.0. We classify each score in the lower tri-
angular portion of the matrix into one of three qualitative groups as follows: 
Low 3.0 – 4.2 
Medium 4.2 – 4.8 
High 4.8 – 6.0 
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likelihood of sole authorship) while ignoring the middle scores. We 
predict that judges who self-author their opinions will tend to receive 
a much greater number of high-compression-score opinions, after net-
ting out all the low-compression-score opinions. Table 2 reports the 
rankings based on this GZip variation. 
TABLE 2 
RANKING BASED ON NUMBER OF HIGH - LOW GZIP SCORES 
RANK JUDGE CIRCUIT 
NUMBER OF HIGH COMPRESSION 
SCORES MINUS NUMBER OF LOW 
COMPRESSION SCORES 
1 Randolph, A. Raymond DC 3 
2 Manion, Daniel A. 7 2 
2 Ginsburg, Douglas H. DC 2 
2 Garza, Emilio M. 5 2 
2 McKee, Theodore A. 3 2 
2 Cole, R. Guy, Jr. 6 2 
2 Gilman, Ronald Lee 6 2 
2 Sentelle, David B. DC 2 
2 Tashima, A. Wallace 9 2 
10 Ebel, David M. 10 1 
10 Tjoflat, Gerald Bard 11 1 
10 Posner, Richard A. 7 1 
13 Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 0 
13 O’Scannlain, Diarmuid F. 9 0 
13 Rovner, Ilana Diamond 7 0 
. . . . 
98 Boudin, Michael 1 -5 
 As with the initial GZip methodology, our test judges fail to score 
consistently well in the GZip score variation. Posner scores in the top 
fifteen, coming in tied at number ten with three other judges. 
Easterbrook also scores highly, tied at thirteenth. Forty-seven other 
judges, however, are also tied at thirteenth. Boudin is the lowest-
ranked judge in terms of authorship. Given the small number of each 
judge’s opinions that we examined, differences among judges in the 
GZip variation are not great enough to make fine-tuned distinctions 
among judges. Our first cut at both black-box tests resulted in fail-
ure: Neither GZip test produced results consistent with our a priori 
information that Posner, Easterbrook, and Boudin author their own 
opinions more than other circuit court judges. 
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 What does the foregoing suggest? First, it may be that the small 
sample of data that we used for each judge, four randomly selected 
opinions, was inadequate. We may need to use a larger set of opin-
ions for each judge for the black-box tests to have any traction. More-
over, our opinions are all selected within a narrow time frame (1998 
to 2000). A high authorship score for a particular judge may indicate 
that the same clerk wrote some, if not all, of the four opinions for the 
judge. Choosing opinions spread out across a longer time frame will 
reduce the possibility that a high authorship score is due, in fact, to a 
particular clerk. 
 Second, the fact is that legal writing in a particular subject matter 
area contains genre-specific language. Tests such as the GZip algo-
rithm look for similar word patterns. Legal opinion writing is likely 
to have considerable genre-specific commonality. The vast majority of 
opinions are likely to mention phrases such as “standard of review” 
or “summary judgment” or “motion to dismiss.” If there are enough of 
these common phrases in all the opinions, they may swamp the calcu-
lations. Put differently, legal opinion writing as a genre may have 
such a distinct style that genre-specific tests must be devised for it.  
C.   White-Box Tests 
 Our simple black-box tests without subject matter controls failed 
to distinguish judges based on the degree of authorship. While the 
black-box tests worked well in comparing generic texts with one an-
other, we suspect that they failed in the judicial context due to the 
specialized nature of many types of judicial opinions. Opinions of the 
same genre, for example, may use various forms of jargon and other 
common phrases that are shared in the opinions of different judges. 
Even judges who do not self-author their own opinions will receive a 
high same-authorship score for opinions within the same genre. 
 Despite the failure of our simple black-box tests, we contend that 
additional tests geared to controlling for the subject matter of specific 
opinions may still work to distinguish judges based on the degree of 
opinion authorship. We call these tests our “white-box” tests. At least 
three categories of white-box tests are possible based on citation 
practices, language patterns, and a more nuanced version of the 
black-box GZip methodologies.  
1.   Citation Practices 
 Citations are a key element in the crafting of judicial opinions. 
Judges who write their own opinions may display specific patterns in 
the opinions they cite, tending to cite opinions with which they are 
more familiar. We perhaps acted too hastily in cleaning the opinions 
used in our black-box tests of the citations to other opinions. The pat-
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terns of citations themselves provide crucial information on author-
ship. Other things equal, two opinions with the same citation pat-
terns (for example, citing the same set of opinions) are more likely to 
be authored by the same author than two opinions without the same 
citation pattern. 
 One type of citation pattern involves self-citations. Landes, Lessig, 
and Solimine conjecture that judges who write their own opinions are 
likely to be more familiar with these opinions, which would lead to 
greater self-citation rates.91 Law clerks, by contrast, are likely to 
simply conduct Westlaw searches or draw from the parties’ briefs. A 
higher average number of self-citations per opinion is therefore likely 
to correlate with a greater likelihood of authorship.  
 Importantly, self-citation patterns are at least somewhat invari-
ant with the subject matter of an opinion. A judge who tends to cite 
her own work will cite her own criminal law cases when writing a 
subsequent criminal law opinion and her own securities law cases 
when writing a subsequent securities law opinion. Subject matter 
may, nonetheless, still be important if a judge writes opinions in a 
particular area more frequently because she will, as a result, cite her 
own opinions in that area more frequently. 
 As a quick test of the hypothesis that self-citation rates correlate 
with authorship, we examine the self-citation patterns using our 
1998 to 2000 dataset. We focus in particular on whether the three 
test judges reputed to author their own opinions are among the top 
scorers on self-citations. Table 3, infra, reports the self-citation rates 
ranking for our test judges and the top fifteen scorers in our ranking. 
The self-citation rate is defined as the average number of self-
citations (measured from 1998 to 2003) to each judge’s opinions writ-
ten in the 1998 to 2000 sample time period. Because we focus on each 
judge’s opinions from the same three-year period, each judge starts 
with a similar pool of opinions that they may self-cite. In addition, 
the use of a pool of opinions from the same time period controls for 
changes in self-citation patterns over time. 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See Landes et al., supra note 14, at 274 (“It is not implausible that judges who 
write their own opinions will cite themselves more frequently than judges who do not—if 
only because they have a greater familiarity with their own prior opinions.”). 
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TABLE 3 
RANKING BASED ON SELF-CITATION RATE 
RANK JUDGE CIRCUIT 
AVERAGE 
SELF-
CITATIONS 
TO EACH  
OPINION 
T-TEST OF 
DIFFERENCE WITH THE 
MEDIAN JUDGE*  
(EQUAL VARIANCES) 
1 Selya, Bruce M. 1 2.44 7.00** 
2 Wollman, Roger L. 8 1.56 3.93** 
3 Lynch, Sandra L. 1 1.48 4.15** 
4 Posner, Richard A. 7 1.46 2.81** 
5 Clay, Eric L. 6 1.40 4.44** 
6 Carnes, Ed 11 1.31 4.02** 
7 Garland, Merrick B. DC 1.31 4.52** 
8 Moore, Karen Nelson 6 1.23 3.12** 
9 Kelly, Paul J., Jr. 10 1.12 3.13** 
10 Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 1.10 2.04** 
11 Ebel, David M. 10 1.08 2.73** 
12 Coffey, John L. 7 1.03 2.15** 
13 Murphy, Michael R. 10 1.03 2.61** 
14 Kanne, Michael S. 7 1.02 2.07** 
15 Marcus, Stanley 11 1.02 3.21** 
. . . . . 
27 Boudin, Michael 1 0.61 0.89 
* The median judge (Mary Beck Briscoe) is chosen as the forty-ninth 
ranked judge out of ninety-eight total judges. 
** Indicates a significance level of 5%. The self-citation rate for Mary 
Beck Briscoe was 0.35 to each opinion. 
 In Table 3, we observe that both Posner and Easterbrook are in the 
top ten judges out of the sample of ninety-eight circuit court judges in 
terms of self-citation rates. Boudin, on the other hand, is ranked twenty-
seventh, although he still is in the top half of all judges. For each judge, 
we perform a two-sided t-test assuming equal variances between that 
judge’s self-citation rate and the median judge’s—Mary Beck Briscoe—
self-citation rate. All the top fifteen judges are significantly different at 
the five percent confidence level from the median judge. 
 Note that the t-statistic test we perform in comparison with the 
median judge does not tell us anything about whether Posner’s au-
thorship score is significantly different from the next-ranked judge 
(Clay). When we compare Posner against Clay, we do not find any 
statistically significant difference. Nevertheless, assuming that au-
thorship is a positive, part of our goal in ranking judges is to incen-
1114  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1077 
 
tivize all judges to exert greater effort in authoring their judicial 
opinions. Even if no statistically significant difference exists between 
any two particular judges, the ranking will induce judges to exert ef-
fort. So long as greater effort increases the likelihood that a judge 
will rank higher than another judge (even if not with statistical sig-
nificance), the judge will have an incentive to exert more effort.92 
 Second, we examine invocation rates. An invocation is a citation 
whereby the judge is mentioned in the citing opinion by name (other than 
a perfunctory use of the name as, say, part of a parenthetical indication 
that the judge authored a particular dissenting or concurring opinion).93 
Higher invocation rates for a judge’s opinions, we posit, correlate with a 
higher likelihood that the invoked judge authored her own opinions. 
 How are invocations related to authorship? We assume that judges 
have institutional knowledge as to which of their colleagues write their 
own opinions. Because an invocation represents a special indication of 
respect to the judge being cited (ordinarily judges are not referred to by 
name), it is unlikely that the special respect will be given unless the 
judge in question is one who writes her own opinions.94 Put differently, a 
judge who is known to delegate the majority of her opinions to the clerks 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Judges may write opinions of different length. The longer the opinion, the greater 
the likelihood that the opinion will receive a self-citation (due, for example, to the greater 
amount of analysis in a longer opinion). To control for this possibility, we also ranked the 
judges in our sample based on the average number of self-citations to each written opinion 
page. We provide the ranking below.  
RANK JUDGE CIRCUIT AVERAGE SELF-CITATIONS 
TO EACH OPINION PAGE 
1 Wollman, Roger L. 8 0.3393 
2 Posner, Richard A. 7 0.3283 
3 Bruce M. Selya 1 0.3230 
4 Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 0.2520 
5 Kelly, Paul J., Jr. 10 0.1873 
6 Lynch, Sandra L. 1 0.1673 
7 Carnes, Ed 11 0.1612 
8 Moore, Karen Nelson 6 0.1600 
9 Clay, Eric L. 6 0.1443 
10 Coffey, John L. 7 0.1378 
11 Garland, Merrick B. DC 0.1343 
12 Tacha, Deanell Reece 10 0.1334 
13 Kanne, Michael S. 7 0.1331 
14 Ebel, David M. 10 0.1296 
15 Ripple, Kenneth F. 7 0.1246 
. . . . 
20 Boudin, Michael 1 0.1016 
Note that Posner and Easterbrook do even better than in the self-citation rate per opinion 
measure. Boudin also does better, but still remains outside the top fifteen. 
 93. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 58-61 (defining invocations and analyzing 
judges based on the rates at which their names are invoked in other opinions).  
 94. See Landes et al., supra note 14, at 274 (“It is also not implausible that judges 
who write their own opinions will be more influential, since their opinions will be more 
consistent and, if good, then more consistently good than opinions written by law clerks.”).  
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is unlikely to find her judicial colleagues invoking her. They may cite the 
judge, if her opinion is on point, but will be unlikely to invoke her and 
thereby give her a special measure of respect.95  
 Invocation rates are at least somewhat robust to the subject matter 
of opinions. A judge who is held in high regard among other judges will 
tend to receive invocations for all types of opinions. Nonetheless, subject 
matter will not be completely irrelevant to the extent that judges do 
tend to invoke other judges for specific types of opinions (for example, 
Easterbrook on corporate and commercial-related law). Table 4 reports 
the results from the invocation rate ranking. A judge’s invocation rate is 
defined as the average number of invocations (measured from 1998 to 
2003) of each judge’s opinions written in the 1998 to 2000 time period. 
TABLE 4 
RANKING BASED ON INVOCATION RATE 
RANK JUDGE CIRCUIT 
AVERAGE  
INVOCATIONS 
TO EACH  
OPINION 
T-TEST OF DIF-
FERENCE WITH THE 
MEDIAN JUDGE*  
(EQUAL VARIANCES) 
1 Posner, Richard A. 7 0.664 6.34** 
2 Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 0.442 3.78** 
3 Calabresi, Guido 2 0.228 3.08** 
4 Wilkinson, J. Harvie, III 4 0.185 2.59** 
5 Edmondson, J.L. 11 0.138 1.17 
6 Higginbotham, Patrick E. 5 0.124 1.34 
7 Luttig, J. Michael 4 0.124 1.14 
8 Jones, Edith H. 5 0.109 0.98 
9 Boudin, Michael 1 0.096 1.30 
10 Walker, John M., Jr. 2 0.095 1.11 
11 Clay, Eric L. 6 0.086 0.83 
12 Cabranes, José A. 2 0.086 0.92 
13 Kleinfeld, Andrew J. 9 0.085 0.86 
14 Tjoflat, Gerald Bard 11 0.083 0.55 
15 King, Carolyn Dineen 5 0.082 0.77 
* The median judge (Terence T. Evans) is chosen as the forty-ninth 
ranked judge out of ninety-eight total judges. 
** Indicates a significance level of 5%. The invocation rate for 
Terence T. Evans was 0.039 to each opinion. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 95. On this special measure of respect that accrues to those judges doing their own 
work, Justice Brandeis famously said that “[t]he reason the public thinks so much of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who 
do their own work.” DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 116 (5th ed. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also John G. Kester, 
The Law Clerk Explosion, LITIGATION, Spring 1983, at 20, 62.  
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 All three of the test judges score in the top ten in terms of invoca-
tion rates. Indeed, Posner and Easterbrook are numbers one and two, 
respectively, in the ranking. Both Posner and Easterbrook’s scores, in 
addition, are significantly different from the median judge’s (Terence 
T. Evans) score. Posner’s and Easterbrook’s high t-statistics indicate 
that they are relatively more likely to self-author compared to the 
median judge in a statistically significant manner. Some evidence ex-
ists that a ranking based on invocation rates may distinguish among 
judges based on their self-authorship of judicial opinions. Nonethe-
less, reputation may reflect a judge’s long-term self-authorship pat-
tern rather than the degree of authorship in any particular set of 
contemporary opinions. 
 Judges who write their own opinions, in addition to being more 
likely to cite themselves, might also be more likely to cite a smaller 
number of other judges relative to the average citation pattern. 
Judges are likely to have a more fine-tuned sense of which of the 
other judges are worthy of citation than their law clerks. Once a 
judge identifies her set of preferred other judges, the judge is likely to 
stick with them in her citation pattern, leading to a relatively low 
level of variance in citations. On the other hand, where clerks author 
the opinions, they will not necessarily cite to the same set of judges 
but may cite to widely differing judges. The variation in the number 
of different judges cited, therefore, will likely be higher with a judge 
who delegates extensively compared with a judge who tends to au-
thor her own opinions. Because our 1998 to 2000 dataset does not 
contain information on the specific identities of judges that a particu-
lar judge cites, we are unable to test whether variance in citation per-
forms well in distinguishing our a priori set of judges who are re-
puted to self-author their opinions. We leave this test to another pa-
per.96 
2.   Subject Matter-Neutral Language Patterns 
 The writing of judges who author their own opinions will likely 
display patterns. While specific word patterns (for example, use of 
the phrase “habeas corpus”) may be subject matter-specific, some 
patterns may not depend on the subject matter of a judicial opinion. 
The use of these genre-neutral patterns provides an alternative 
“white-box” method of testing for authorship. 
 For example, some judges will tend to write short opinions and 
others will write longer ones. Some will use extended quotes and oth-
ers will not. When judges delegate to clerks, however, there will 
likely be greater variation in the types of opinions because clerks will 
                                                                                                                     
 96. We are in the process of collecting these data now.  
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have their own styles. For some fixed number of opinions, a judge 
who writes her own opinions is likely to have a smaller opinion-size 
variation than a judge who does not. In our opinion, neither the 
length of the opinion (or average paragraph or sentence) nor the use 
of block quotes are necessarily tied to any specific subject matter or 
area of the law. 
 For each of the ninety-eight judges in our sample, we calculated 
the standard deviation of the length of each majority opinion based 
on published pages in the West Federal Reporter and excluding the 
summary and West keynotes. The standard deviation of majority-
opinion length is for opinions from the 1998 to 2000 time period for 
each judge. Table 5 reports the judges’ rankings based on the stan-
dard deviation of majority-opinion length. 
TABLE 5 
RANKING BASED ON STANDARD DEVIATION  
OF MAJORITY-OPINION LENGTH 
RANK JUDGE CIRCUIT 
STANDARD DEVIA-
TION OF MAJORITY-
OPINION LENGTH 
F-TEST  P-
VALUE* 
1 Loken, James B. 8 1.81 0.0000 
2 Posner, Richard A. 7 1.84 0.0000 
3 Martin, Boyce F., Jr. 6 1.84 0.0087 
4 Wollman, Roger L.  8 1.92 0.0002 
5 Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 1.99 0.0002 
6 Black, Susan H. 11 2.21 0.0277 
7 Arnold, Morris S.  8 2.25 0.0044 
8 Boudin, Michael  1 2.33 0.0091 
9 Ginsburg, Douglas H. DC 2.37 0.0267 
10 Hawkins, Michael Daly 9 2.51 0.0636 
11 Schroeder, Mary M. 9 2.53 0.0586 
12 Tashima, A. Wallace 9 2.64 0.0707 
13 Walker, John M., Jr. 2 2.64 0.0638 
14 Nygaard, Richard L. 3 2.67 0.1243 
15 Sentelle, David B. DC 2.73 0.1146 
* The F-test provides a test of the null hypothesis that the standard 
deviation of opinion length for a particular judge is the same as the 
standard deviation for the median judge (Deanell Reece Tacha). The 
standard deviation of opinion length for Deanell Reece Tacha was 
3.65. 
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 As with the self-citation rate and invocation rate tests, Posner 
and Easterbrook score in the top-ten judges. In addition, Boudin—
who was in the top ten for the invocation rate test but not for the 
self-citation rate test—is also ranked among the top-ten judges 
based on a lower standard deviation of opinion length. The differ-
ences between the standard deviation scores for Posner, Easter-
brook, and Boudin compared with the score for the median judge 
(Deanell Reece Tacha) are significant at the one percent level. The 
standard deviation of the majority-opinion length for the judges 
successfully distinguished our test judges in terms of both high 
rank among our sample judges and comparison with the median 
judge. 
 We also hypothesize that judges who write their own opinions 
will produce shorter opinions with fewer quotes. They have a lim-
ited amount of time, and a large amount of work, and they are 
more confident about what they are saying. In Table 6, infra, we 
provide a ranking of our ninety-eight judges according to average 
length of majority opinions during the 1998-2000 time period. The 
length of each opinion is based on published pages in the West 
Federal Reporter excluding the summary and West keynotes. The 
average printed pages per majority opinion is equal to the total 
length of all opinions for a particular judge divided by the number 
of opinions written from 1998 to 2000. 
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TABLE 6 
RANKING BASED ON AVERAGE PAGES PER MAJORITY OPINION 
RANK JUDGE CIRCUIT 
AVERAGE 
PRINTED 
PAGES PER 
OPINION 
T-TEST OF  
DIFFERENCE WITH 
THE MEDIAN JUDGE* 
(UNEQUAL  
VARIANCES) 
1 Arnold, Morris S. 8 3.94 -10.14** 
2 Easterbrook, Frank H. 7 4.38 -9.47** 
3 Posner, Richard A. 7 4.44 -9.51** 
4 Loken, James B. 8 4.48 -9.06** 
5 Ginsburg, Douglas H. DC 4.65 -7.22** 
6 Wollman, Roger L. 8 4.66 -8.48** 
7 Martin, Boyce F., Jr. 6 4.73 -6.84** 
8 Schroeder, Mary M. 9 4.93 -6.20** 
9 Black, Susan H. 11 5.04 -5.86** 
10 Bowman, Pasco M. 8 5.17 -5.91** 
11 Murphy, Diana E. 8 5.32 -5.27** 
12 Evans, Terence T. 7 5.36 -5.76** 
13 Higginbotham, Patrick E. 5 5.65 -4.49** 
14 Kozinski, Alex 9 5.70 -3.17** 
15 Edmondson, J.L. 11 6.00 -3.08** 
. . . . . 
18 Boudin, Michael 1 6.09 -4.17** 
* The median judge (Paul V. Niemeyer) is chosen as the forty-ninth 
ranked judge out of ninety-eight total judges. Niemeyer had an aver-
age majority opinion length of 7.67 pages.  
** Indicates a significance level of 5%. 
 Posner and Easterbrook again appear among the top-ten judges in 
terms of likelihood of self-authorship. Boudin, however, falls out of 
the top ten and is ranked number eighteen, but still within the top-
twenty judges. The average majority-opinion page length for all three 
test judges was significantly lower than the average page length for 
the median judge (Paul V. Niemeyer) as deduced using a two-sided t-
test assuming unequal variances. 
 Other frequency-based tests may prove feasible. A judge writing 
an opinion will be less likely to footnote her opinion heavily than the 
law clerk.97 Clerks, because of their lower knowledge base, higher 
level of insecurity, and law review training, are more likely to feel a 
need to footnote the document. We predict, therefore, that a lower 
                                                                                                                     
 97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (citing Posner, who hypothesizes that 
clerks will use more footnotes). 
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number of footnotes per opinion (or per page) correlates with a higher 
likelihood of self-authorship.98 
3.   Revisiting the Black-Box Tests 
 We and others may learn from the failure of our initial run at the 
“black-box” GZip-based tests. In order to take advantage of genre-
specific information and to control for genre-specific commonalities 
across opinions written by different authors, at least three changes to 
our methodology are possible. 
 First, to control for the possibility that a particular clerk may 
dominate a judge’s opinion writing for a specific year, the sample of 
opinions for each judge should span a relatively long time period—
certainly greater than the three years covered by our 1998 to 2000 
time period. Increasing the number of opinions for each judge—from 
four to ten, for example—may also provide traction to the GZip re-
sults. 
 Second, as discussed above, we were too zealous in our desire to 
remove unnecessary information from our opinions. The informative-
ness of the opinions (on the issue of authorship) would likely have 
been greater if we had kept the citation information. Keeping citation 
information also greatly reduces the work required in preparing opin-
ions for the GZip-based tests. 
 Third, a study could control for the noise generated from compar-
ing opinions across different areas of the law. Suppose Judge A 
writes her own opinions while Judge B does not. If we compared four 
                                                                                                                     
 98. We used two other less sophisticated methods based on the publicly available Lit-
stat program. For the Litstat tool on the Internet, see Matthew Bielich, LitStat, at 
http://www.pinionsolutions.com/litstat/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). Authors with distinc-
tive styles and patterns are assumed to use similar types of sentence and word structures 
in all of their writing. Using the Litstat program, we calculated the alphabetical frequency 
of a text, that is, the frequency with which the words in that text begin with a certain let-
ter of the alphabet. Frequency of commonly used words is an indicator of the specificity of 
style. Thus, each author is likely to have a set of words that he or she may use more fre-
quently than other authors. A frequency distribution of words could thus be an indicator of 
the stylistic uniqueness. For each judge we used two samples of text of 8000 characters 
each. As with our other black-box tests, we did not control for the subject matter of the ju-
dicial opinions. As with the GZip test, we cleaned the text. Here, however, we did not take 
out common words such as “and” and “the,” because the information as to those commonly 
used words is actually important to these supplementary tests. The alphabetical distribu-
tion of the words in the opinions is the output of the tool. This output is copied to a spread-
sheet, and the average of the difference of these values for the two opinions is calculated—
the lower the average, the higher the probability of sole authorship. None of our three con-
trol judges were in the top fifteen judges in terms of probability of sole authorship. We also 
used the Litstat program to calculate the average sentence length in a fixed amount of text 
(8000 characters, after the text has been cleaned for citations, quotes, West headnotes and 
other extraneous information). We predicted that the variance in these frequencies would 
be smaller among documents authored by the same author than among those authored by 
different authors. Only Boudin scored in the top fifteen judges (at number two) in terms of 
probability of sole authorship. 
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opinions by Judge A on diverse areas of the law (including, for exam-
ple, criminal law, bankruptcy law, administrative law, and securities 
regulation) against four opinions by Judge B on securities regulation, 
Judge B will likely receive a higher same-authorship score. Such a 
pattern, possible where opinions are randomly selected without re-
gard to subject matter, may introduce noise into the analysis.  
 A simple control for such noise would be to select randomly opin-
ions from the same subject matter area of the law—criminal law, for 
example. It is possible that the common phrases in criminal law opin-
ions (for example, “habeas corpus”) are so frequent that all judges 
will receive the identical same-authorship score even with this con-
trol. Nonetheless, to the extent that, after taking into account the 
common baseline vocabulary, judges do have idiosyncratic writing 
styles, the GZip methodologies should pick up on these differences in 
determining authorship. 
 We leave implementing these white-box controls to the black-box 
tests for the genre-specific nature of opinions for our next paper. 
IV.   CONCLUSION: OTHER POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF AUTHORSHIP 
TECHNOLOGY 
 This Essay only touches the surface of the world of technology that 
might be applied to determine judicial authorship of opinions. The 
results of the white-box tests are but a preliminary step toward de-
termining authorship. Even assuming that these white-box tests 
have a significant amount of explanatory power to determine author-
ship, each of the white-box tests measures something that, at best, 
correlates with authorship. We suspect that meaningful progress in 
this area will require a serious collaborative research effort between 
legal academics and scholars in computational linguistics. Such tech-
nology, once developed, has the potential to assist in areas other than 
research on the judiciary. We list a couple below. 
A.   Securities Fraud Complaints 
 Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 to combat frivolous litigation.99 Proponents of the Act argued 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys literally cut-and-pasted complaints together 
to file suit against any company that experienced a large drop in 
stock price, regardless of whether any real evidence of fraud ex-
                                                                                                                     
 99. For a discussion of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the 
impact of the Act on both frivolous and meritorious claims, see STEPHEN J. CHOI, DO THE 
MERITS MATTER LESS AFTER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT? (N.Y.U. 
Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-04, 2004), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=558285. 
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isted.100 Congress intended the Reform Act to force plaintiffs’ attor-
neys to take more care in their filings and provide particularized fac-
tual assertions as to why fraud in fact exists.  
 We may be able to use the authorship methodology to determine 
how “close” two securities fraud complaints are to one another. If a 
complaint is really a cut-and-paste job, the complaint is likely to re-
ceive a high same-authorship score when compared to other securi-
ties complaints from the same law firm. If the Reform Act resulted in 
more particularized investigation before the filing of a complaint, we 
predict that a set of pre-Reform complaints from the same law firm 
would produce a higher same-authorship score as compared to a set 
of post-Reform complaints from the same law firm. 
B.   Boilerplate Contract Evolution 
 The contracts used in a variety of settings such as the corporate 
bond area are commonly described as boilerplate. In other words, 
essentially the same standard language gets repeated in every con-
tract in the market. Even if individual drafters do not know what 
the contract language means, it gets repeated because everyone 
else in the market is using it. Problems can arise when, in the 
course of a dispute, the two sides assert different meanings for 
some piece of ambiguous language whose original understanding 
has long since been lost.  
 Authorship testing programs may be used to trace the original 
source of the later contracts. Finding the source is potentially im-
portant for at least two reasons. First, from a practical dispute-
resolution point of view, knowing the original understanding might 
help resolve the current dispute (to the extent the judge decides 
that the original understanding should govern). Second, from a re-
search point of view, the ability to track the evolution of contract 
language can help us understand how contract language evolves, 
how it becomes boilerplate, and what circumstances produce 
changes in boilerplate.101  
                                                                                                                     
 100. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical 
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 904-05 (1996) (discussing one 
plaintiff’s attorney’s reference to Philip Morris’ success in the “toy industry” as evidence of 
cut-and-paste complaints) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101. For an empirical examination of how standardized sovereign bond covenants have 
evolved over time (not using authorship methodology), see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gu-
lati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 
53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004).  
